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My dissertation examines issues in determining program eligibility and participation 
in education and Social Security Disability Insurance program, and analyzes the effectiveness 
of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundations Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship Program. 
 
In my first chapter I investigate school responses to incentives created by No Child 
Left Behind to alter special education placement, and use these responses as instruments to 
estimate the effect of special education placement. I use administrative data from the 
universe of North Carolina Public Schools and a difference-in-difference framework in which 
incentives are determined by the interactions between schools’ expectations about subgroup 
performance on the one hand and student performance and subgroup membership on the 
other. I find that schools use special education to target supports and services to students 
close to the passing threshold in reading when the school benefits from their passing. 
Schools also select the special education group to be higher performing when doing so 
benefits the school. Special education decreases attendance and has large negative effects 
on the math scores of some marginal students.  
 
The second chapter explores the effect of time spent waiting for a Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) decision on health and well-being. Previous research has shown 
that SSDI in general, and wait time in particular, depresses labor market activity, but other 
effects are largely unexplored. I use administrative data from the Social Security 
Administration linked to the National Health Interview Survey, and use summary data to 
create instruments for wait time. A longer wait increases the number of conditions causing 
activity limitations and the likelihood of having current benefits at survey, and decreases the 
likelihood of seeking a reconsideration or having benefits terminated at survey.  
 
The Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship Program (MMUFP) aims to increase the 
number of underrepresented minorities entering earning PhDs, with an eye to improving 
their representation in academia. The third chapter evaluates whether the MMUFP increased 
the number of PhDs achieved by underrepresented minority students (URMs) at participating 
undergraduate institutions. The chapter finds no evidence that participation in the program 
causes a statistically significant increase in the numbers of PhDs completed by URM students, 
and increases greater than about one PhD per institution per cohort lie outside a 95% 
confidence interval of the estimates. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ACCOUNTABILITY INCENTIVES AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 
1. Introduction 
About 13 percent of students in US public schools receive some form of special 
education, with specific learning disabilities and speech or language impairments the most 
common conditions (U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics 
2016). In 2012-2013, about 19 percent of public school spending was on students who 
received special education, amounting to approximately $118 billion (Federal Education 
Budget Project 2014, U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics 
2013). However, the effect of special education on student outcomes is not well understood. 
In theory, special education could either improve or hurt student achievement. Students who 
receive special education can benefit from extra attention and individualization, better 
understanding their own learning needs, or accommodations such as extra time for testing. 
On the other hand, they may suffer from stigma, respond to low expectations with low 
effort, or miss out on opportunities available to their peers in regular education (Bear, 
Clever, & Proctor, 1991, Lackaye & Margalit 2006).  
Public schools are legally required to provide a free and appropriate public education 
to students with disabilities. Decisions about whether a student is disabled and what services 
are needed are made through a complicated interaction of many stakeholders – teachers, 
administrators, school-based specialists, doctors, parents, lawyers, and sometimes the 
students themselves. Although students’ eligibility for special education is based entirely on 
their impairments and educational needs, prior work has shown that the size and 
composition of the special education population responds to school incentives. These 
incentives have included those created by funding formulae and by early accountability 
2 
policies (Cullen 2003, Kwak, 2010, Cullen and Reback 2006, Figlio and Getzler 2006, Cohen 
2007, Bokhari and Schneider 2011, Chakrabarti 2013, Jacob 2005, Mahitivanichcha and 
Parrish 2005, Winters and Greene 2011, Hanusheck and Raymond 2005, Morrill, 2016).   
Under early accountability programs students enrolled in special education were not 
included in the accountability population and were in many cases exempt from testing. This 
presented schools facing accountability pressure with an incentive to encourage low-
performing students to enter special education. No Child Left Behind, a federal law enacted 
in 2002, required all states to introduce accountability programs that held schools 
responsible for the performance of all students as well as student subgroups defined based 
on demographics. One of these subgroups was the group of students with disabilities (SWD). 
A school made adequate yearly progress (AYP) only if all of its subgroups, including students 
with disabilities, met targets for participation, proficiency, and either attendance or 
graduation rate.1  
These new accountability programs presented schools with at least two incentives to 
alter the assignment of students to special education. First, schools could use special 
education placement to target services, individualization, and testing accommodations to 
“bubble” students expected to be near the passing threshold, particularly those in subgroups 
that were expected to fail to make AYP. Second, schools may have tried to select their special 
education population to be higher-performing in order to make it more likely that the SWD 
                                                 
1 Beginning in the 2011-2012 school year states were granted waivers from major requirements of 
NCLB, and it was replaced in 2015 by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). However, the 
accountability systems currently in place maintain the features of NCLB that underpinned its 
incentives for schools to alter the special education population. They judge performance at least in 
part based on the percentage of students who pass a given cut-score, include nearly every student in 
testing and accountability, and count the special education population as a separate subgroup that 
must meet standards. 
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subgroup made AYP. In this scenario, schools that had previously failed to make AYP for the 
SWD group would be more likely to assign a student to special education if they expected 
that student to achieve a passing rather than a failing score, especially if the SWD group was 
close to the AYP threshold. It is unknown to what extent schools respond to accountability 
policies put into place since the enactment of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), which were 
crafted in part to eliminate the incentives in early accountability programs. 
I use student-level administrative data from all public school students in grades 4-8 
in North Carolina from 2007-2011 to examine how schools responded to accountability 
incentives under NCLB to classify particular students into special education. I do so by looking 
for evidence that schools use special education to target services to “bubble” students near 
the passing threshold when the school’s AYP performance could be improved by their 
passing, or that schools select the special education population to be relatively high-
performing when the school expects that the SWD subgroup will fail to make AYP. I use a 
difference-in-difference framework in which incentives are determined by the interactions 
between schools’ expectations about subgroup performance and students’ performance and 
subgroup membership. My analysis is focused on students with relatively malleable 
diagnoses, such as learning disabilities, speech and language impairments, and ADHD. I find 
evidence that schools used special education to target supports and services to bubble 
students in reading when the school would benefit from that student passing, with students 
who previously scored in the achievement level just below passing about 1 percentage point 
more likely to be in special education.2 Students just below the passing threshold in math are 
less likely to be in special education, while those just above the passing threshold in math are 
                                                 
2 I consider schools able to benefit from a student passing if that student was a member of a subgroup 
that had previously failed to reach the AYP passing threshold. 
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unaffected. This pattern is probably shaped by the fact that math scores are generally easier 
to alter through instruction than are reading scores, as well as the fact that all schools had 
incentives to increase their overall passing rate. Also, schools face funding incentives to limit 
the overall size of the special education population, so may discourage some students from 
receiving special education in order to make room for others. 
Responses to the second incentive are clearer. Compared with students who had 
previously failed, schools were relatively more likely to place previously passing students in 
special education when they were trying to improve the likelihood that the students with 
disabilities group achieved AYP, particularly in reading. A student who had previously passed 
their reading test would be about 2 percentage points more likely to be in special education, 
relative to a prior-failing student, if their school faced the highest incentive to select the SWD 
group based on reading versus the lowest incentive. This finding is fairly robust across 
specifications, but the pattern in math is weaker and not consistently significant. Responses 
to the second incentive appear to be driven primarily by fewer prior-failing students being in 
special education when their school faces accountability pressure, rather than more prior-
passing students. 
I then use differences in the second set of incentives across schools and students as a 
source of plausibly-exogenous variation in the likelihood a student was assigned to special 
education to estimate the effect of special education on test scores in an instrumental 
variables framework. Special education decreased math scores by more than a standard 
deviation for students whose placements were driven by accountability incentives in math. 
Estimates for the reading scores for these students are similar in magnitude but not 
significantly different from zero, while those for students whose placements were altered by 
incentives to improve the performance of the SWD subgroup in reading are not statistically 
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significant. I investigate several mechanisms and fail to find evidence of changes to grade 
retention or school switching, but do find changes in student effort as measured by 
attendance.  This suggests that the lower engagement among special education students 
that has been documented previously is at least partially caused by special education 
placement, and has consequences for achievement. 
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, I extend our 
knowledge of how schools alter the assignment of students to special education in response 
to incentives. I do so by offering the first estimates of school responses to the special 
education incentives presented by NCLB, which are similar to those in current accountability 
policies. Special education placement should depend only on a student’s impairments and 
needs, so any response to these incentives is important to understand. Prior work on this 
topic has focused on pre-NCLB policies in which schools had a straightforward incentive to 
place low-performing students into special education (Jacob 2005, Cullen and Reback 2006, 
Figlio and Getzler 2006, Cohen 2007). No Child Left Behind and current accountability policies 
were designed in part to eliminate this incentive, so the opportunities for schools to 
strategically change special education placement are more nuanced and targeted different 
groups of students.  
Second, my estimates of the effect of special education placement on marginal 
students adds to a very sparse literature on the subject that has relied on strong assumptions 
for identification. Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) examine students who move in and out 
of special education programs using student fixed effects and find that special education 
improves math scores. Their identification rests on two assumptions that I can relax: that any 
omitted variables that are correlated with both achievement and placement are static over 
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time, and that changes in achievement do not cause changes in placement.3 The paper most 
similar to this analysis is an unpublished working paper by Cohen (2007), who constructed 
instruments for special education placement based on Chicago’s accountability program in 
the 1990s.4 Her results are too noisy to draw conclusions about what effects, if any, 
placement has on student achievement. Cohen’s analysis also rests on the assumption that 
schools that faced pressure to increase the percentage of students who performed at grade 
level did not undertake other measures, aside from encouraging special education 
placement, that would have improved the performance of low-achieving students.5  
My findings suggest that near-universal testing requirements and an emphasis on the 
performance of malleable subgroups eliminates one set of incentives – to put low-achieving 
students in special education – but creates another – to target resources to bubble students 
and select the SWD group to be high-performing. This is a useful lesson for accountability 
design, particularly as these features have continued beyond the end of NCLB. I also find 
evidence that special education can harm achievement for some of the marginal students 
whose placement is altered in response to accountability pressure. My results suggest that it 
is important to ensure that special education is appropriately targeted. More research is 
needed to understand the mechanisms the underlie heterogeneity in the effect of being 
placed in special education. 
                                                 
3 They are also missing data on the substantial portion of special education students who did not take 
standardized tests during this period. This could potentially induce selection bias, in either direction, 
depending on which students did not take tests. 
4 Chicago’s accountability policy placed elementary schools on probation if less than 15 percent of 
students performed at grade level, defined as scoring least at the 50th percentile on the Iowa Test of 
Basic Skills (ITBS).  
5 A similar assumption would be needed in order to use the first incentive I consider – that to target 
resources to “bubble” students when the school would benefit from their passing – as an instrument 
for special education placement. Because it seems unlikely that this exclusion restriction would hold, 
my IV analyses use only the second incentive – that to select the SWD group to be higher performing. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. I present background information on 
special education, accountability, and other relevant policies in Section 2. In Section 3 I 
summarize prior research. Section 4 describes the data and sample. Next, in Section 5, I 
discuss the method used to estimate school responses to AYP incentives and the results of 
this analysis presented. In Section 6, I present the method used to estimate the effect of 
special education on achievement, the results of the analysis, and an investigation into 
potential mechanisms. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Policy Background 
 In this section I discuss several policies and institutions. These include special 
education, No Child Left Behind, and North Carolina’s state accountability policy. I then 
describe the resulting incentives to alter the special education population. 
2.1 Special Education 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) public schools must 
provide a free and appropriate public education (FAPE), delivered in the least restrictive 
setting possible, to students who are diagnosed with one of 13 categories of disability (e.g. 
specific learning disability, autism, visual impairment) that impedes their ability to learn or 
participate in other age-appropriate activities.6 The nature and extent of services vary widely 
depending on the student’s needs – one student might receive weekly speech therapy, while 
another attends regular classes accompanied by a 1-on-1 aide, and a third student spends his 
time in a separate program. Special education students are lower-performing on average 
than their regular education peers, but there is substantial overlap between the two groups 
                                                 
6 Some students who do not have one of the 13 impairments listed under the IDEA receive 
accommodations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which covers a broader set of 
conditions with a looser legal framework. I focus on students who are covered by the IDEA. 
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in terms of achievement, as shown in Figure 1. In the first panel, the distribution of math 
scores for students in special education is drawn with a bold solid line, and that for students 
not in special education with a thin dashed line. The x-axis is in standard deviation units 
relative to the average scores across all students.7  The second panel of Figure 1 displays a 
similar pattern using reading scores. 
Figure 1. Math and Reading Scores by Special Education Status 
 
Notes: Figure shows the distribution of math and reading scores, standardized to have mean 
zero and standard deviation 1 for each grade-year-subject grouping, graphed separately by 
special education status. 
 
Before a student is placed into special education someone – often a parent or teacher – 
notices that the student is struggling and requests a disability assessment. The school then 
conducts a disability evaluation, which assesses the students’ abilities and needs across 
                                                 
7 These scores reflect the normalization described in detail in section 4. Dropping scores from 
alternate tests, rather than normalizing them to be comparable with regular tests, results in very 
similar patterns. 
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multiple dimensions.  A group of stakeholders meets to establish an individualized education 
program (IEP), which details the services and supports the student will receive, as well as the 
setting in which they will be provided. These meetings include parents, teachers, 
administrators, specialists, and sometimes lawyers or the students themselves. Diagnoses 
are reviewed at least every 3 years, and IEPs every year.  
Most states provide funding for special education to local education agencies (LEAs, 
essentially school districts) either based on the number of students enrolled or the number 
of special education students. North Carolina is alone in providing special education funding 
calculated as a set dollar amount multiplied by either the number of students with IEPs or 
12.5 percent of LEA membership, whichever is smaller (Morrill, 2016). This unusual funding 
structure makes North Carolina a uniquely useful setting, as it can offer insights into school 
behavior under both common funding mechanisms. Schools in states that provide funding 
based on the total number of students face funding incentives similar to those faced by 
schools in North Carolina LEAs with more than 12.5 percent of their students in special 
education. Schools in states that provide funding based on the number of special education 
students are in situations more similar to those of schools in North Carolina LEAs below the 
12.5 percent funding cap.  
2.2 No Child Left Behind 
No Child Left Behind, a federal law enacted in 2002, required states to establish 
testing programs and evaluate schools based on students’ math and reading performance. 
States were given some leeway in determining implementation details. This paper focuses on 
NCLB as implemented in North Carolina, primarily from 2006-2007 – 2010-2011, so I 
concentrate here on characterizing that version of the policy. This time restriction allows me 
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to work with a relatively consistent set of policies and offers advantages in data availability, 
described in Section 4.  
Under NCLB, each school receiving Title I funding was accountable for the 
performance and participation of the overall population of students as well as several 
subgroups defined by race/ethnicity, income, and disability status. About half of US public 
schools receive Title I funding, which is available to schools and districts with relatively high 
poverty as measured by participation in the Federal School Lunch Program. For a school to 
achieve Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP), at least 95% of the students in each group were 
required to contribute scores, the percentage of students demonstrating proficiency needed 
to meet target levels, and the school had to show progress on the other academic indicator 
(OAI): attendance and/or graduation rate. If a subgroup had fewer than 40 students it was 
not considered, with the exception of the full student sample. 
Schools faced no consequences in their first year of AYP failure, but those that failed 
to make AYP in subsequent years could face sanctions. These included being forced to allow 
their students to choose a different school, to provide extra services, or to undergo major 
restructuring, depending on the number of consecutive years AYP had not been achieved. 
Adequate Yearly Progress was determined separately for both reading and math, such that a 
school could be in year 1 of AYP failure for one subject and year 3 for the other. 
Consequences were based on the higher of these two numbers.  
There were several conditions under which a school that had not achieved all the 
AYP requirements would be treated as though it had done so. Schools that achieved the 
participation requirement and made progress in the other two measures could receive “safe 
harbor” and avoid sanctions. Consequences also were withheld if the proficiency threshold 
was within a 95% confidence interval of the actual level of proficiency or if the proficiency of 
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the population eligible for or receiving Title I targeted assistance met the threshold. Students 
who had exited LEP status or special education in the previous two years could also be 
included in proficiency counts. All of these details resulted in variation across schools, years, 
and subjects in whether an AYP failure would result in sanctions, in addition to variation 
across subgroups in whether the subgroup could be expected to make AYP. I exploit this 
variation, in addition to differences across students in subgroup membership and expected 
performance, in order to identify school reactions to incentives and the effect of special 
education on student achievement. 
2.3 State Accountability  
In North Carolina, NCLB operated in tandem with the state’s own “ABC” program, 
which was first implemented in 1996 and continued with slight alterations over the period 
studied. Under “the ABCs,” schools were labelled with various positive and negative terms 
based on individual student growth and the percentage passing. For example, in 2006-2007, 
schools that met AYP, met expected growth, and had at least 90% proficiency across grades 
and subjects were labelled as Honor Schools of Excellence (NCDPI 2007).8 Among schools 
with at least expected growth, those with at least 90% proficiency were labelled as Schools of 
Excellence, those with 80-89% proficiency as Schools of Distinction, those with 60-79% 
proficiency as Schools of Progress, and those with less than 60% proficiency as Priority 
Schools. For those schools not making expected growth, those with at least 60% proficiency 
were labelled No Recognition Schools and those with 50-59% proficiency were Priority 
Schools. Those with less than 50% proficiency that did not make expected growth were 
labelled as Low-Performing Schools, and were provided with state assistance such as 
                                                 
8 A school met expected growth if, on average, students at least maintained their achievement level 
from the prior year.  
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additional professional development. Schools that achieved high or expected growth could 
receive teacher bonuses.  
While many of the principles underlying NCLB and the ABCs are similar, the precise 
inputs to the accountability formulae, the relative emphasis on growth vs. proficiency, and 
the cut-points are different across the two regimes. The ABCs also does not hold schools 
accountable for the performance of subgroups defined based on demographics or special 
education status. Thus, incentives created by the ABCs should be uniform across students 
with similar performance, regardless of their subgroup membership or the AYP performance 
of their school. However, it is possible that school responses to AYP incentives would have 
been different if they were not also trying to react to the state program, as the ABCs 
incentivizes increases in the percent proficient regardless of subgroup membership or the 
school’s past performance. 
Two additional features of the North Carolina context deserve mention. First, schools 
that did not receive Title I funding were evaluated under the NCLB standards. Their 
performance, overall and for subgroups, was announced, but there were no consequences 
directly tied to whether or not these schools made AYP. These schools were evaluated 
according to NCLB standards in all states, but states varied in how they used this information. 
I focus on the experiences of Title I schools, which faced stronger incentives that were 
consistent across states. Second, North Carolina qualified for an early waiver to the standard 
NCLB framework beginning in 2005-2006. This allowed students to count towards the 
school’s proficiency rate if they either performed above the cut score or were exhibiting 
growth that suggested they would reach proficiency within four years of their initial test. This 
was uncommon when introduced by became more common elsewhere by the end of NCLB. I 
incorporate this detail into one measure of school expectations of student performance and 
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find that is does not alter my results substantially. While these two policy details are 
important for understanding my analysis, they do not seriously limit its generalizability. 
2.4 Resulting Incentives 
 Prior to NCLB, accountability programs allowed schools to exclude special education 
students from their accountability populations and often from testing. Thus, a school could 
appear to have improved its performance by steering low-performing students into special 
education. 
In contrast, there is no such option under NCLB and subsequent policies. Instead, schools 
could encourage special education for “bubble” students who are expected to be close to the 
passing threshold as a way of targeting services and supports to them. This could improve 
the school’s AYP performance if it expected to otherwise fail to make AYP for at least one 
subgroup of which the student was a member. Schools that expected to fail to achieve AYP 
for the SWD subgroup had an incentive to try to improve its performance. One way of doing 
this would be to change the group’s composition by encouraging special education for 
students who were expected to pass and/or discouraging those who were expected to fail. 
This strategy would be most useful to schools that were close to the AYP threshold, so they 
could change their rating by moving a relatively small number of students.   
3. Prior Literature 
My analysis is related to two strands of prior literature. The first has analyzed how 
schools respond to incentives. The part of this literature that is most closely related to this 
paper has addressed accountability policy incentives to alter special education placement. All 
previous work has focused on those in force before NCLB. These policies, examined by Jacob 
(2005), Hanushek and Raymond (2005), Cullen and Reback (2006), Figlio and Getzler (2006), 
Cohen (2007) and Bokhari and Schneider (2011), held schools accountable for student 
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performance but, importantly, allowed special education students to be excluded from the 
accountability population and often from testing. Thus, a school could increase its chance of 
passing by placing low-performing students into special education, and schools facing 
accountability pressure did just that. When programs monitored the performance of 
subgroups, members of those groups at risk of not meeting benchmarks were more likely 
than other students to enter special education, especially for students whose exclusion from 
accountability improved the school’s performance (Cullen and Reback 2006). Using state-
level variation in the roll-out of accountability policies pre-NCLB, Hanushek and Raymond 
(2005) found no evidence that these policies increased special education rolls, but Bokhari 
and Schneider (2011) found that accountability systems that provided rewards for good 
performance increased the number of ADHD diagnosis in the public school population, as 
well as the use of medication. None of this research has considered responses to more 
recent accountability policies, which were crafted in part to eliminate these incentives. 
More broadly, a rich literature has explored how schools responded to NCLB. These 
responses include focusing on tested grades and subjects, focusing on the needs of “bubble” 
students whose passing status might change as a result, altering the testing pool through 
discipline, and even altering the content of school lunches on testing days (e.g. Figlio, 2006; 
Figlio and Winicki, 2008; Griffith and Scharmann, 2008; Krieg, 2008; Reback, 2008; Byrd-Blake 
et al., 2010; Dee and Jacob, 2010; Ladd and Lauren, 2010; Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010). I 
add to this literature by considering responses along a different margin, that of special 
education placements. 
 Prior work also has shown that schools respond to financial incentives to alter the 
size and composition of their special education population. These incentives can come in the 
form of state funding formulas (Cullen, 2003; Kwak, 2010; Mahitivanichcha and Parrish, 
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2005; Morrill 2016) or voucher programs open only to students with disabilities (Winters and 
Greene, 2011; Chakrabarti, 2013). I contribute to this research by presenting evidence on 
how financial and accountability incentives interact. 
The second strand of literature addresses how students are affected by special 
education assignment. Only two previous papers have applied rigorous research designs to 
the question directly. 9 Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) used student fixed effects in a 
panel dataset from Texas in the 1990s and found small but significant gains in test scores in 
years in which students were in special education. Their identification strategy requires two 
assumptions that I am able to relax. First, they assume that any omitted variables that are 
correlated with both special education status and achievement are static, which would not 
be true if students’ impairments change over time. Second, they must assume that changes 
in achievement do not cause changes in special education placement, at least after 
controlling for observable factors. This would be of particular concern if students are more 
likely to be placed in special education when struggling and to leave special education when 
performing well, so that regression to the mean would appear as a positive effect of special 
education.  
In an unpublished working paper, Cohen (2007) used the accountability policy 
implemented by Chicago Public Schools in 1996 to construct instruments for special 
education placement. She found evidence that schools responded to incentives to place low-
achieving students into special education but was not able to detect effects on attendance, 
                                                 
9 While not a direct analysis of the effect of special education on achievement, Setren (2016) 
demonstrates that special education students who win charter lotteries experience gains similar to 
those of their classmates who were not previously in special education, despite charters’ practice of 
removing special education classifications at a high rate. Multivariate regressions suggest the removal 
of special education classifications is either not harmful or improves scores. 
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graduation, or GPA. Her analysis also rests on an assumption that schools trying to improve 
the percentage of students scoring at grade level would not do anything, aside from altering 
special education placement, that would affect the outcomes of low-achieving students.10 
While this may be true for the very lowest achieving, who saw the greatest increase in 
special education placement, it is less likely for students only slightly below the average, 
whose probability of being in special education also increased. 
While previous work has addressed many ways that schools responded to a variety 
of NCLB incentives, and school responses to the special education incentives in accountability 
policies that existed prior to NCLB, this paper is the first to consider school responses to the 
incentives in NCLB to alter the special education population. In doing so I am able to evaluate 
to what extent recent accountability policies have solved the problems identified in the 
earlier literature on incentives to alter the special education population. I also provide an 
estimate of the effect of special education on student achievement, contributing to a small 
literature based on strong assumptions that I relax. My estimates are local to students whose 
placements can be altered by schools. While this limits their generalizability it also means 
that they are relevant to the very group of students for whom it is most important to know 
the effect of special education. 
4. Data 
I use restricted-access student-level information from the North Carolina Education 
Research Data Center (NCERDC) and public use school-level information from the North 
Carolina Department of Education and the Common Core of Data. Student-level files provide 
                                                 
10 I would need to make a similar assumption in order to use the incentives to target services to 
bubble as instruments for special education. For this reason I do not do so, and instead only use the 
incentives to select the special education population as instruments. 
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year-by-year information on tests taken, standardized test scores, testing accommodations, 
disability classifications, and demographics. These files are linkable across years to create a 
panel that includes the universe of North Carolina public school students who were in tested 
grades during the years I examine.  I also draw information on which schools a student 
attended in which grades and year from the student-level files. To the student data I add 
information on school characteristics and the number of years of AYP failure each school had 
in math and reading for all students and subgroups.  
Based on their scores, students are assigned to one of four achievement levels 
numbered 1-4, defined by whether students have mastered grade-level content sufficiently 
to be prepared for the next grade.11 Students in achievement levels 3 and 4 are proficient, 
while those in levels 1 and 2 are not. Under North Carolina’s growth model, students who are 
in levels 1 or 2 but are on track to be proficient within 4 years of initial testing can be 
considered proficient for purposes of determining AYP. In my main specification, I assume 
schools expect students to perform about as well in the current year as in the past year, so 
this growth component is not relevant. However, I take the growth model into account when 
considering whether schools treated students who would need small gains to achieve 
proficiency differently from those who would need larger gains and find similar results. Thus, 
this modeling assumption does not drive my results. 
North Carolina offered a series of alternate tests to students for whom the standard 
test was inappropriate, including special education students whose IEPs specified that they 
would take these tests. The alternate tests mean I have access to information on almost all 
students in the tested grades, but scores must be standardized to allow for comparisons 
                                                 
11 North Carolina has since switched to a 5-category classification, but used this 4-category system 
during the period I consider. 
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across tests. To do so, I first assume that students who scored at a given achievement level 
cutoff have the same achievement – that is, students who just received passing scores for a 
given grade, year, and subject had the same achievement, regardless of test taken.12 Then I 
assume the distance between achievement levels has the same meaning for all tests for a 
given grade, year, and subject – that is, students who scored halfway between the level one 
and level two cut points have the same achievement, regardless of test taken. Finally, I form 
z-scores by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation for each grade, year, 
subject combination. This produces a set of scores with mean zero and standard deviation 
one for each grade, year, and subject.  
Special education serves students with a variety of disabilities. The distribution of 
diagnoses for special education students in North Carolina in grades 4-8 during my sample 
period is reported in Table 1. Schools are unlikely to be able to influence the special 
education placement of students with many impairments, such as a visual impairment or 
traumatic brain injury. I consider the likelihood of being in one of two broad categories of 
diagnoses – those that are likely to be relatively malleable and those that seem especially 
                                                 
12 While taking an alternate test might improve the score of a student who would struggle to 
demonstrate their knowledge on a standard test, the most common of these tests, the NCEXTEND2, 
evaluated students relative to grade-level standards. For example, the reading form “uses shorter 
reading selections, simplified language, and fewer test items and item responses (foils/answer 
choices) to assess students on grade-level content” (North Carolina Public Schools, 2009, p 5). The cut 
scores between achievement levels were selected through a similar procedure for both the 
NCEXCEND2 and the regular end of grade tests. First, a group of students who met the eligibility 
criteria piloted the tests. Then the teachers of these students were asked to use their knowledge of 
the students’ classroom performance to categorize them into achievement levels. Test makers noted 
the percentage of students expected to score in each achievement level, and set cut scores 
accordingly. That is, if the teachers reported that 15 percent of the 4th grade students tested were in 
achievement level 1 the test makers set the cut off between levels 1 and 2 such that the lowest 15 
percent of scores were in level 1 (North Carolina Public Schools, 2009). Cut scores were then reviewed 
and approved by a panel of policy makers and stakeholders. To the extent that this assumption is 
incorrect my results would be biased towards finding positive effects of special education, suggesting 
that its true negative effects are even larger than estimated. 
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difficult for schools to alter. Malleable impairments are speech and language impairments, 
learning disabilities, emotional and behavioral disorders, and other impairments (which 
includes ADHD). Non-malleable impairments are autism, intellectual disability, 
developmental disabilities, sensory disabilities, traumatic brain injury, orthopedic 
impairments, and multiple disabilities. I focus on malleable diagnoses defined this way in my 
main analysis. Estimates that include students with autism in the malleable group appear in 
Appendix Table A.6 and are similar to my main results. I also use the non-malleable 
diagnoses to conduct a falsification test. 
Table 1. Distribution of Diagnoses in Special Education 
 Percent of Students 
Percent of Special Education 
Students 
Autism 0.7 4.9 
Deaf-Blindness 0.0 0.0 
Developmental Delay 0.0 0.0 
Emotional Disturbance 0.6 4.7 
Hearing Impairment 0.1 1.1 
Intellectual Disability 1.9 14.1 
Multiple Disabilities 0.1 1.1 
Orthopedic Impairment 0.1 0.5 
Other Health Impairment 2.6 19.4 
Specific Learning Disability 5.9 44.8 
Speech or Language Impairment 1.2 8.8 
Traumatic Brain Injury 0.0 0.2 
Visual Impairment 0.0 0.3 
   
Total 13.2 100 
Notes: Table reports the percent in special education by diagnosis for the sample of students 
in North Carolina Title I schools in grades 4-8 in years 2006-7 – 20010-11. Diagnoses shaded 
in grey (emotional disturbance, other health impairment, specific learning disability, speech 
or language impairment) are included in the “malleable impairment” category. 
 
Data from the alternative tests are available beginning in 2006, so I begin my analysis in 
2007 to have at least one previous year of data for students taking the alternative tests. This 
restriction also allows me to analyze a consistent policy environment, as North Carolina 
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began using student gains in its AYP calculation in 2005-2006.  I also exclude third-grade 
students, as most do not have a prior year test score. 
I remove from the analysis sample students who are missing information on current 
special education status, current or previous standardized test scores, or the performance of 
their school and subgroups in the past.13 I loosen the requirement to have current-year 
scores when considering whether schools altered the testing population in response to 
incentives. Students with incomplete data are only included in the sample for the years and 
subjects for which complete information is available, resulting in an unbalanced panel. I 
investigate the relationship between incentives and attrition in section 5.4. In baseline 
specifications, I drop all those who ever appear in the data with a non-malleable diagnosis, 
so as not to confuse changes of diagnosis with movement in and out of special education. 
This restriction is altered when considering the effects of incentives on having a non-
malleable diagnosis, and as a robustness check in Appendix Table A.2. Results are not 
sensitive to the exclusion of students who had a non-malleable diagnosis at some point in 
time. 
My main sample, described in Table 2, comprises about 1.3 million student-year 
observations, representing about 700,000 students in seventeen hundred schools.14 About 
10.5 percent of the students in my sample were in special education. While about 13 percent 
of students in North Carolina were in special education, my main sample excludes those who 
had a non-malleable diagnosis at any point in time, decreasing the percent in special 
                                                 
13 Of students in the grades and years considered, 8.9 percent are missing prior-year test sores. This 
includes students who are in their first year in North Carolina Public Schools. Among those with prior-
year test scores, 1.4 percent are missing information on prior school performance. Of those with data 
on prior test scores and prior school performance 0.4 percent are missing information on school Title I 
status. 
14 Descriptive statistics for those who ever had a non-malleable diagnosis appear in Table A.3.  
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education. About half were female, and 57 percent were eligible for free or reduced-price 
lunch. Slightly less than half the sample identified as White/Caucasian, 31 percent as Black, 
and 12 percent as Hispanic. Most had passed their standardized test in the previous year, 69 
percent in reading and 73 percent in math. Twenty two percent were in schools that had 
failed to achieve AYP thresholds in math for at least one subgroup in the previous year, and 
18 percent were in schools that had failed to do so in reading. Students in special education 
were significantly less likely to have passed their test in the previous year and more likely to 
be low-income. This demonstrates the disadvantaged nature of the special education 
population, which is part of the empirical challenge of identifying the causal effect of 
placement. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Main Analysis Sample 
 All 
Not Special 
Education 
Special 
Education 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Special Education 0.105 0.306     
Prior Pass Reading 0.692 0.462 0.730 0.444 0.364 0.481 
Prior Pass Math 0.732 0.443 0.764 0.425 0.463 0.499 
Native American 0.023 0.151 0.023 0.150 0.024 0.154 
Asian 0.017 0.130 0.018 0.135 0.007 0.085 
Hispanic 0.124 0.329 0.126 0.332 0.104 0.306 
Black 0.311 0.463 0.307 0.461 0.351 0.477 
White 0.488 0.500 0.489 0.500 0.476 0.499 
Other 0.037 0.188 0.037 0.188 0.037 0.190 
Female 0.497 0.500 0.516 0.500 0.331 0.470 
Free or Reduced-Price 
Lunch 0.570 0.495 0.556 0.497 0.691 0.462 
School failed in math 0.221 0.415 0.220 0.414 0.222 0.416 
School failed in reading 0.184 0.387 0.184 0.388 0.184 0.387 
Math Score -0.100 0.946 -0.024 0.923 -0.743 0.889 
Prior math score -0.109 0.948 -0.030 0.923 -0.779 0.894 
Reading Score -0.105 0.962 -0.022 0.924 -0.814 0.979 
Prior reading score -0.107 0.965 -0.015 0.922 -0.896 0.959 
N 1,298,002 1,161,922 136,080 
Notes: This table presents descriptive information on the main analysis sample. Test scores 
are in standard deviation units. 
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5. School Responses to Accountability Incentives 
5.1 Method 
I first examine school responses to accountability incentives, then consider the effect of 
special education placement on student outcomes. I assume that schools make decisions 
about special education placements at least once a school year. This is consistent with US 
Department of Education regulations that require IEPs to be reviewed every 12 months or 
more often if necessary (US Department of Education, 2000).  When making these choices, 
they may consider a wide array of information about their students but only take AYP 
incentives for the current year into account. This assumption would be violated if a school 
tried to slow its improvement this year in order to make improving next year easier.  While it 
is likely that schools would want to plan ahead, it seems less likely that they would be able to 
do so effectively. This assumption allows me to consider a static model in which schools 
respond to current incentives. If it is incorrect my estimates will not reflect all responses to 
accountability incentives but would still reflect current year responses to current year 
incentives - a relevant parameter. 
I address the question of how NCLB incentives altered disability classifications by testing 
two main hypotheses about school responses to incentives as outlined in Section 2.4. First, 
schools that are at risk of failing to make AYP may use special education as a way to target 
extra services to “bubble students” whose passing status could reasonably be changed.  
(1) 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ [ 𝛽𝛽2𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + ∑ [𝑎𝑎=2,3  𝛽𝛽3𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 +𝑠𝑠=𝑟𝑟,𝑚𝑚 𝛽𝛽4𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖]] +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
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In Equation (1), an indicator for whether student i in grade g in school j in year t is in 
special education (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is a function of observed characteristics of student i (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) as well 
as whether student i is a bubble student (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) just above the passing threshold (a = 
3) or just below (a = 2) in reading (s = r) or math (s = m), whether the school has an 
accountability incentive to ensure that student i passes (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) as defined in the 
next paragraph, and an interaction between those final terms for each subject. All models 
include year by grade fixed effects (𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Main estimates include school fixed effects (𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖); 
estimates without school fixed effects are available from the author upon request. Student 
characteristics include prior scores in math and reading as well as indicators for lagged 
special education status, LEP status, free or reduced-price lunch eligibility, and the racial and 
ethnic categories used by NCLB.  
I consider a school to have an incentive to improve the likelihood of student i passing if 
the school failed to make AYP in the previous year for any subgroup – not including the SWD 
group– into which student i falls and would face sanctions for future AYP failures. For 
example, if student i is economically disadvantaged and Hispanic the school would have an 
incentive to ensure that the student passes if the school was at risk of failing AYP for all 
students, Hispanic students, or economically disadvantaged students, and would face 
consequences for doing so. As discussed in more detail in section 2.2, some schools that did 
not achieve AYP requirements avoided AYP failure status. Schools with these types of failures 
in the past year would not receive immediate sanctions if they failed in the current year. 
I define bubble students in two ways. First, I consider that schools may target their 
actions bluntly based on the achievement levels in which students scored in the previous 
year. To do this I define bubble status as having scored in achievement level 2 or 
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achievement level 3 in the previous year. Because schools may treat students who previously 
passed differently from those who previously failed, I include separate terms for being in 
level 2 or level 3.  
Second, I consider that schools may target their actions more precisely to students 
particularly close to the passing threshold. In doing so, I incorporate North Carolina’s gain 
score model, under which any student who was on a trajectory to reach proficiency within 4 
years of their first test could be counted as passing for AYP targets. I define an inverse 
measure of the amount by which a student’s score would need to rise or fall in order for 
them to just count as passing for AYP determinations. I begin by defining the student’s 
distance from counting as passing. For students who passed and students who failed but are 
in at least 7th grade, this is the absolute difference between the student’s score and the test’s 
cut score. Students in sixth grade or lower who failed the previous year can count as passing 
in the current year if they improve enough to be on a trajectory to be proficient by seventh 
grade.  I approximate this needed improvement as their distance from the cut score divided 
by the number of years left before seventh grade. I then use the distance from counting as 
passing to construct an inverse distance measure standardized across grades, years, and 
subjects. To do this I calculate the largest distance to counting as passing for each grade-
year-subject combination. The standardized measure of the inverse distance to counting as 
passing is the largest distance for the grade-year-subject minus the student’s distance, 
divided by the largest distance for the grade-year-subject. In my models, I test whether this 
measure of distance matters for either students who previously scored in level 2 or in level 3.  
If schools use special education to target services to almost-passing (just-passing) 
students, I would expect to find positive coefficients on 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟2 and 𝛽𝛽4𝑚𝑚2 (𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟3 and 𝛽𝛽4𝑚𝑚3) when 
using the simple definitions of bubble group membership. To the extent that schools focus 
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on those very close to passing even among level 2 (level 3) students, I would also find 
positive values when defining bubble status based on the inverse distance from counting as 
passing for level 2 (level 3) students.  
Second, schools that are at risk of failing to make AYP for the SWD subgroup could 
attempt to select their special education population to be relatively high performing. I test 
for this possibility using the following model:  
(2)  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ [𝛽𝛽2𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∗𝑠𝑠=𝑟𝑟,𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖] + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  .  
The special education status of student i still depends on student characteristics and 
year-by-grade fixed effects. Now, the school’s incentive is an interaction between the 
student’s predicted performance (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝚤𝚤𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖� ) in each subject and whether the school is at the 
margin of failing to make AYP in that subject for the SWD subgroup (𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖). I 
assume that a school’s best prediction about a student’s performance this year is their score 
last year (or, alternately, whether they were proficient last year). To define to what extent 
schools are at the margin of failing to make AYP in a subject for the SWD subgroup, I create 
an inverse measure of the amount a school would have to improve their performance to 
meet AYP.  
(3) 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = �1 − �𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1−𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1 �� ∗  𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1  
In Equation (3), the degree to which school j’s SWD subgroup is marginal to passing in subject 
s and year t (𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) is defined based on the schools’ percent proficient in the 
previous year (𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1), the AYP threshold for that subject and year ( 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1), and an indicator for whether the school had failed to make AYP for the 
SWD group in the previous year (𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1). Figure 2 illustrates the MarginalSWD 
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measure for a sample of schools that had failed to make AYP in the previous year. The 
measure takes on a value of 0 for schools in which no SWD students passed in the previous 
year and climbs linearly with the percent of SWD students passing until reaching a value of 
nearly 1 for schools just below the AYP threshold. The measure is 0 for schools in which the 
SWD group achieved AYP, either by having a passing rate at or over the threshold, or through 
one of the alternate calculations discussed earlier. 
Figure 2. SWD Incentive Instrument  
  
 
Notes:  This figure depicts the SWD incentive instrument as described in Equation (3).  
 
In reality, many schools that fail in one group fail in more than one – roughly half of 
schools that failed in the SWD subgroup also failed in another group and most schools that 
fail in another group fail in the SWD subgroup. As a result, many schools are faced with both 
incentives simultaneously.  Some of the students in these schools will also be the targets of 
both incentives; consider a student who just passed and whose school failed to make AYP 
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both for the SWD group and a demographic subgroup of which the student is a member.  For 
this reason, I model them together as in equation (4) below. 
(4) 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ [ 𝛽𝛽2𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + ∑ [𝑎𝑎=2,3  𝛽𝛽3𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 +𝑠𝑠=𝑟𝑟,𝑚𝑚 𝛽𝛽4𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖] +  𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽6𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽7𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖] +   𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
This model identifies causal effects of accountability-related incentives on placement 
under two assumptions. For the first hypothesis, the assumption is that placement 
differences between bubble and non-bubble students when schools do not have an AYP 
incentive to improve the students’ likelihood of passing reflect the differences by bubble 
status that would exist for students whose schools have an AYP incentive to improve their 
likelihood of passing, in the absence of that incentive.  Suppose for a given year and subject 
NCLB required 84 percent proficiency for all groups. The parallel trends assumption would be 
violated if, in the absence of AYP incentives, the change in placement that a bubble student 
experiences when one of the subgroups to which they belong goes from having at least 84 
percent proficiency to less than 84 percent proficiency was different from the change 
experienced by a non-bubble student.  
For the second hypothesis, the assumption is that differences in placement by prior test 
score would not vary with the SWD group’s passing rate relative to the AYP threshold in the 
absence of AYP incentives. This would be violated if, in the absence of AYP incentives, the 
change in placement a previously passing student would experience if their school’s SWD 
group went from above 84 percent proficiency to below was different from that of a 
previously failing student.  
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Students and parents have their own incentives surrounding special education, and 
schools face other sources of pressure. However, most student and parent incentives do not 
change around student passing thresholds, and those that do should not change around 
schools’ AYP thresholds. That is, a student’s parents may want them to be in special 
education to improve their performance, and this will appear in coefficients on prior score or 
demographics. Some of those families will probably push harder for placement if their 
student is struggling, or perhaps if they appear to be almost doing “well enough” but need a 
slight boost. Schools may similarly use scores to identify struggling students. Both of these 
responses will appear in the coefficient on expected score or being a “bubble” student. In the 
absence of accountability incentives, these reasons for special education classification do not 
change when the school is at risk of failing to make AYP or when the student is important to 
the school’s effort to do so. Similarly, in a world without NCLB, schools’ identification of 
struggling students by their score should not depend on the student’s subgroup membership 
or the SWD group’s performance. Thus, the interaction terms that identify school responses 
to incentives and form my instruments should reflect only school responses as a result of 
NCLB incentives. 
5.2 Placement Responses to AYP Incentives 
Figure 3 illustrates the residual percentage of students in the main analysis sample 
who had a malleable diagnosis after controlling for demographics, prior score, and year-by-
grade fixed effects, by the student’s distance to a passing score in math the previous year. 
The first series, marked with a solid line, includes all those whose school expected to fail AYP 
for a group of which that student was a member, and the school would face consequences 
for such a failure (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 1). The second series, marked with a dashed line, 
includes those whose school either did not expect to fail AYP for any group of which that 
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student was a member or did not face sanctions for such a failure (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 0). Most 
students (about 69 percent) whose school had previously failed to make AYP for a group of 
which they were a member also failed to make AYP for the SWD group, so had positive 
values of 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. Nearly all students whose schools did not have an incentive to 
improve their likelihood of passing also did not have an incentive to improve the 
performance of the SWD group (97 percent). As a result the figure illustrates responses to 
both incentives simultaneously. 
Figure 3. Residual Percent with Malleable Diagnosis by Distance to Passing Score in Math and 
Accountability Incentives 
 
Notes: This figure displays the residual percent of students with a malleable diagnosis, after 
controlling for prior score and demographics, by the student’s distance from the passing 
threshold measured in standard deviations. The first series, marked with the solid line, 
includes students whose school expected to fail AYP for at least one group of which the 
student was a member, and would potentially face consequences for doing so. The second 
series, marked with the dashed line, includes all other students.  
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Figure 4. Residual Percent with Malleable Diagnosis by Distance to Passing Score in Reading 
and Accountability Incentives 
 
Notes: This figure displays the residual percent of students with a malleable diagnosis, after 
controlling for prior score and demographics, by the student’s distance from the passing 
threshold measured in standard deviations. The first series, marked with the solid line, 
includes students whose school expected to fail AYP for at least one group of which the 
student was a member, and would potentially face consequences for doing so. The second 
series, marked with the dashed line, includes all other students. 
 
Students who previously received a failing score or just passed were more likely to 
be in special education with a malleable diagnosis if their school did not have an incentive to 
improve their performance. Those who had previously passed by more than about a 
standard deviation were about as likely to be in special education regardless of whether their 
school had an incentive to improve their performance.  There is a similar pattern in reading, 
illustrated in Figure 4. If hypothesis 2 is correct we would expect the relatively likelihood of 
being in special education for previously-passing versus previously failing students to be 
higher in schools with incentives to improve the performance of the SWD subgroup. Figures 
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3 and 4 suggest that this is the case, and that the lion’s share of the selection takes place 
through discouraging special education for previously-failing students, rather than 
encouraging special education for previously-passing students.  
If schools use special education to target supports and services to bubble students 
when the school would benefit from their achieving a passing score, as suggested by 
hypothesis 1, we would expect the presence of an AYP incentive to increase residual 
malleable diagnoses close to the passing threshold. There is a noticeable bump in malleable 
diagnoses in Figure 3, peaking around a quarter of a standard deviation below the passing 
threshold. The pattern appears more dramatic for those whose schools had an AYP incentive 
to improve their likelihood of passing, but is also present for those without such an incentive.  
A broadly similar pattern holds in reading, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
I now turn to a more systematic examination of how schools respond to 
accountability incentives using Equation (4). The next several tables are structured similarly. 
Each column displays estimates from a single regression. In the odd columns, “bubble” status 
is defined using binary indicators of achievement level, while the even columns test whether 
the distance from the cut sore matters for students in levels 2 or 3, as detailed in the 
previous section. In columns 1 and 2, I test whether schools select students based on prior 
passing status when trying to improve the performance of the SWD subgroup; columns 3 and 
4 use prior score. Student demographics, year-by-grade fixed effects, and school fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. Estimates without school fixed effects are available from the 
author upon request.  
32 
Table 3. Effect of Accountability Incentives on Special Education Placement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reading Level 2*Incentive 0.0142**  0.00930**  
 (0.00302)  (0.00283)  
Math Level 2*Incentive -0.0115**  -0.0133**  
 (0.00353)  (0.00300)  
Reading Level 3*Incentive 0.0252**  0.0239**  
 (0.00285)  (0.00272)  
Math Level 3*Incentive -0.000835  -0.000850  
 (0.00193)  (0.00222)  
Reading Level 2*Distance*Incentive  0.0143**  0.0101** 
  (0.00319)  (0.00299) 
Math Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.0139**  -0.0140** 
  (0.00388)  (0.00335) 
Reading Level 3*Distance*Incentive  0.0277**  0.0284** 
  (0.00323)  (0.00312) 
Math Level 3*Distance*Incentive  -0.00352  -0.000355 
  (0.00233)  (0.00277) 
Reading Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.0221** 0.0223**   
 (0.00463) (0.00469)   
Math Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.0125 0.0139   
 (0.00726) (0.00756)   
Reading Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.0110** 0.0115** 
   (0.00254) (0.00258) 
Math Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.00682** 0.00706** 
   (0.00262) (0.00273) 
N 1199737 1199737 1199737 1199737 
Notes: This table displays results from 4 linear probability models following Equation (4), one 
in each column, in which being in special education with a malleable diagnosis is the 
dependent variable. Each model includes demographic controls, year-by-grade fixed effects, 
school-level fixed effects, and the main effects of school incentives and prior student 
performance. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. * denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level.  
 
Table 3 presents the effects of NCLB incentives on the likelihood of being in special 
education with a malleable diagnosis. I will start by discussing the second hypothesis, that 
schools select the special education population to be relatively high-performing when the 
school would benefit from improving the performance of the SWD group. Students who had 
previously passed in reading were 2.2 percentage points more likely to be in special 
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education when their school had an incentive to improve the performance of the SWD group 
in reading, as shown in columns 1 and 2. I find no significant evidence of selection based on 
math performance with this specification. Considering score rather than passing status, as in 
columns 3 and 4, suggests that a one standard deviation higher prior reading score increased 
the likelihood of being in special education by about 1 percentage point when the student’s 
school had just failed to achieve AYP for the SWD group. A math score that was one standard 
deviation higher increased the likelihood that a student would be in special education by 0.7 
percentage points when the student’s school had just failed to achieve AYP in math for the 
SWD group. 
Next, I consider evidence of the first hypothesis. I find that schools encouraged 
special education placement for students who were close to the passing threshold in reading, 
whether above or below. In column 1, when bubble status is measured by having previously 
scored in level 2 or 3, a student who had previously scored in level 2 (level 3) in reading 
would be 1.4 (2.5) percentage points more likely to be in special education if their school 
would benefit from their passing. These estimates are robust to the way selection of high-
performing students is parameterized. I also find evidence that schools targeted those closer 
to the passing threshold more strongly than those farther away, as shown in columns 2 and 
4.  
Schools appear to have discouraged students who had scored in level 2 in math from 
special education when the school would benefit from that student passing, and not changed 
their treatment of level 3 students in math. This may reflect schools believing that there are 
other options available to raise the math scores of almost-passing students. It could also be a 
manifestation of school attempts to control the size of the special education population. To 
investigate this, it is useful to compare schools that had at least 12.5 percent of their student 
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body in special education, and would not receive additional state aid to support further 
special education placements, with those schools with a smaller proportion in special 
education. As shown in Table A.1, schools with at least 12.5 percent of their students in 
special education appear to discourage placement more strongly for students who had 
scored in level 2 in math than do schools with a smaller proportion of students in special 
education. Schools with more than 12.5 percent of their students in special education also 
encourage special education less strongly for students who scored in level 2 in reading, in 
comparison to schools with smaller special education populations. 
5.3 Heterogeneity 
One way of verifying that the estimates from Table 3 reflect school responses to AYP 
incentives is to compare these reactions across groups that faced stronger and weaker 
incentives. If estimates reflect a causal relationship rather than omitted variables those who 
faced stronger incentives should have exhibited larger reactions, or at least not smaller.  
While a school’s incentives surrounding a student do not necessarily depend on that 
student’s underlying impairment, a school’s ability to influence whether the student is in 
special education does. Schools should have much less influence on diagnoses for which it 
would be difficult to not place a student in special education – say a student who is blind or 
uses a wheelchair – than on the relatively malleable diagnoses I consider in my main 
analyses. Table 4 displays the results of relaxing the sample restriction that excluded those 
who had ever had a non-malleable diagnosis and estimating the effect of incentives on non-
malleable diagnosis. I find some evidence that students who had just passed in the previous 
year were less likely to have a non-malleable diagnosis when their school would benefit from 
their passing. However, these effects are quite small in comparison to the results in Table 3, 
and no other coefficients are significant. This does however highlight the fact that some of 
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the diagnoses I am classifying as non-malleable can be influenced by schools, just to a lesser 
extent than the malleable diagnoses.  
Table 4. Effect of Accountability Incentives on Having a Non-Malleable Diagnosis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reading Level 2*Incentive 0.00113  0.000556  
 (0.00184)  (0.00178)  
Math Level 2*Incentive 0.00035  -0.00121  
 (0.00222)  (0.00202)  
Reading Level 3*Incentive -0.00205  -0.00390*  
 (0.00176)  (0.00170)  
Math Level 3*Incentive -0.00053  -0.00365*  
 (0.00153)  (0.00169)  
Reading Level 2*Distance*Incentive  0.000717  -0.0000361 
  (0.00194)  (0.00189) 
Math Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.00099  -0.000853 
  (0.00238)  (0.00221) 
Reading Level 3*Distance*Incentive  -0.00282  -0.00476* 
  (0.00200)  (0.00193) 
Math Level 3*Distance*Incentive  -0.00064  -0.00282 
  (0.00175)  (0.00201) 
Reading Prior Pass*SWD Incentive -0.00039 -0.00041   
 (0.00257) (0.00259)   
Math Prior Pass*SWD Incentive -0.00357 -0.00475   
 (0.00392) (0.00399)   
Reading Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.00253 0.00261 
   (0.00147) (0.00197) 
Math Prior Score*SWD Incentive   -0.00184 -0.00189 
    (0.00156) (0.00162) 
N 1237846 1237846 1237846 1237846 
Notes: This table displays results from 4 linear probability models following Equation (4), one 
in each column, in which being in special education with a non-malleable diagnosis is the 
dependent variable. Each model includes demographic controls, year-by-grade fixed effects, 
school-level fixed effects, and the main effects of school incentives and prior student 
performance. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. * denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level.  
 
I also examine reactions by schools that did not receive Title I funding. These schools 
were still required to test their students in accordance with NCLB mandates, and 
performance was reported publicly. As such they did have incentives to perform well 
according to the NCLB metrics, but these incentives were much lower than for Title I schools, 
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which faced the possibility of sanctions. Unfortunately for this analysis, very few non-Title I 
schools failed to achieve AYP, so there is little variation in the data, resulting in imprecise 
estimates. These results appear in Table A4, and suggest that schools that did not receive 
Title I funding did not use special education to target services to level 3 students whose 
passing would benefit the school. There is some evidence of targeting away from level 2 
students, particularly in reading, and selection against prior-passing students in reading, both 
of which are somewhat puzzling. They may reflect school attempts to keep the special 
education population below the 12.5 percent funding threshold, while using placement to 
respond to other priorities. Non-Title-I schools do appear to have selected students based on 
their math performance when the school expected its SWD group to fail. These point 
estimates are larger than those for Title I schools, but are quite imprecise.  
5.4 Test Taking and Selection 
One of the primary innovations of NCLB was its testing requirement – schools were 
required to have at least 95 percent of students contributing scores, both overall and in each 
accountable subgroup. This drastically decreased the scope for schools to select the tested 
population but did not eliminate it entirely. Schools could still potentially do more to 
encourage test-day attendance for some students than others, and those with especially 
good attendance might be able to actively discourage some particularly low-scoring students. 
Selection of the test taking population would be another way for schools to respond to 
accountability incentives that would not appear in my main analysis. It also would limit my 
ability to use these incentives as instruments for special education placement in the next 
section. Suppose special education had no effect on student achievement, but the same 
accountability pressures that influenced selection into special education drove schools to 
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change the tested population. In this case it would be possible to find effects of special 
education – in either direction depending on how selection into testing took place.  
I investigate whether accountability incentives predict the likelihood a student 
appears in the data with a valid test score. Results appear in Table 5. I find no evidence that 
schools respond to AYP incentives by altering the tested population. This suggests that my 
analysis of the effect of special education on achievement outcomes is not subject to bias 
due to sample selection, something that previous research on the subject likely suffered 
from and was not able to analyze directly. It also suggests that the combination of NCLB’s 
testing requirements and the introduction of alternate tests succeeded in discouraging 
schools from excluding their special education students from testing.  
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Table 5 Effect of Accountability Incentives on Not Having a Valid Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Reading Reading Reading Reading Math Math Math Math 
Reading Level 2*Incentive 0.00157  0.00217  0.00150  0.00212  
 (0.00418)  (0.00416)  (0.00419)  (0.00417)  
Math Level 2*Incentive 0.00535  0.00368  0.00542  0.00373  
 (0.00398)  (0.00353)  (0.00398)  (0.00352)  
Reading Level 3*Incentive -0.00221  -0.00368  -0.00230  -0.00379  
 (0.00391)  (0.00382)  (0.00391)  (0.00383)  
Math Level 3*Incentive -0.00194  -0.000234  -0.00190  -0.000180  
 (0.00276)  (0.00276)  (0.00276)  (0.00275)  
Reading Level 
2*Distance*Incentive  -0.00234  -0.00398  -0.00239  -0.00406 
  (0.00447)  (0.00436)  (0.00448)  (0.00436) 
Math Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.00173  0.000448  -0.00170  0.000519 
  (0.00321)  (0.00324)  (0.00320)  (0.00323) 
Reading Level 
3*Distance*Incentive  0.00215  0.00281  0.00212  0.00280 
  (0.00466)  (0.00464)  (0.00466)  (0.00465) 
Math Level 3*Distance*Incentive  0.00662  0.00483  0.00673  0.00491 
  (0.00438)  (0.00393)  (0.00437)  (0.00392) 
Reading Prior Pass*SWD Incentive -0.00548 -0.00550   -0.00561 -0.00564   
 (0.00448) (0.00451)   (0.00448) (0.00451)   
Math Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.00947 0.00950   0.00960 0.00967   
 (0.00653) (0.00646)   (0.00653) (0.00647)   
Reading Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.000142 0.0000902   0.0000824 0.0000268 
   (0.00226) (0.00226)   (0.00226) (0.00226) 
Math Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.00156 0.00161   0.00160 0.00166 
   (0.00227) (0.00228)   (0.00227) (0.00229) 
N 1199737 1199737 1199737 1199737 1199737 1199737 1199737 1199737 
Notes: This table displays results from 8 linear probability models following Equation (4), one in each column, in which not having a valid reading or math score is the 
dependent variable. Each model includes demographic controls, year-by-grade fixed effects, school-level fixed effects, and the main effects of school incentives and prior 
student performance. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. * denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level.  
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6 Effects of Special Education on Student Achievement 
6.1 Method 
Special education is not randomly assigned, and students who receive special 
education are systematically different from those who do not. As a result, simple 
comparisons of the outcomes of students in and out of special education would not reflect 
the causal effect of placement. To overcome this problem I use incentives from the previous 
section as instruments for special education. In order for the incentives to be valid 
instruments they must obey the exclusion restriction. That is, they must not affect outcomes 
through some mechanism other than special education placement. I do not expect this the 
exclusion restriction to hold in the case of the incentives from the first hypothesis, as prior 
work suggests that schools are able to use other efforts to target resources to students who 
they wish to pass (Reback 2008). For this reason, I do not use the incentives from the first 
hypothesis as instruments.  
The incentives from the second hypothesis make more suitable instruments. For 
these instruments, the exclusion restriction holds as long as school incentives to select the 
SWD population do not affect students’ test scores differentially by score, except through 
changes to special education placement. One threat to this assumption is the possibility that 
schools expend extra effort on selected students to ensure that they pass. The restriction 
would not be violated if the school is making efforts to improve the test performance of 
students in special education in general as a result of accountability pressure for that group. 
To the extent that special education under accountability pressure is different from that 
without, it could limit generalizability. However, my results would still apply to any situation 
where schools make a particular attempt to increase the percentage of students in special 
education achieving proficient scores. Similarly, if some resources or opportunities are not 
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provided to students in special education, perhaps due to time or scheduling constraints, this 
would not bias my results. Rather, it would mean that a move into special education entailed 
not only the addition of services detailed in the student’s IEP but a loss of other services 
provided to students who were not in special education. If for some reason this withdrawal 
of resources only took place when the school was under accountability pressure the result 
might not fully generalize to environments where special education was an additive service 
rather than the exchange of one set of services for another. It is not clear why this would be 
true, and even then the exclusion restriction would not be violated. Finally, it is possible that 
students who are selected into special education based on scoring well in one year 
experience a decrease in score in the next. This reversion to the mean would only confound 
my estimates if it somehow occurred for students in schools with an incentive to improve the 
performance of the SWD group and not for those in schools without that incentive or vice 
versa. There is no reason to believe that this is the case.  
It is also necessary for the instruments to satisfy a monotonicity assumption. This 
would be violated if some students I have labelled as incentive targets were not seen as such 
by their schools and instead were discouraged from being in special education in order to 
“make space” for others. This would require a school to believe that students who failed in 
the previous year were more likely to pass in the current year than those who passed in the 
previous year, which seems extremely unlikely.  
That is (4) serves as the first stage of a model with the second stage: 
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(5) 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ � [ 𝛽𝛽2𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + � [
𝑎𝑎=2,3  𝛽𝛽3𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠=𝑟𝑟,𝑚𝑚+  𝛽𝛽4𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖] +  𝛽𝛽5𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖] + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
In Equation (5) 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the relevant current-year test score or other achievement 
outcome. Special education status (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is a simple indicator for whether the student is in 
special education with a malleable diagnosis in the current year. The model also includes 
student characteristics as well as year-by-grade fixed effects and school fixed effects. 
Estimates without school fixed effects are available from the author upon request. 
6.2 Effects of Special Education on Achievement 
I use Equation (5) to estimate the effect of being placed in special education on a 
marginal student’s same-year achievement. Incentives to select the SWD group to be 
relatively high performing in reading form strong instruments, as shown in Table 6. I do not 
find evidence that special education has an effect on achievement for students whose 
placement is altered by incentives to select the SWD population to have a higher passing rate 
in reading. These estimates are noisy, so I cannot rule out large effects in either direction. 
Math incentives form weaker instruments; only those based on prior score are strong. 
However, these estimates suggest that special education hurts math achievement for those 
students whose special education placement is altered to improve the math achievement of 
their school’s SWD group. Being placed in special education lowers math scores by about 1.2 
standard deviations for this group of students. The point estimates for reading scores for this 
group are also negative, though smaller and not significant at conventional levels. A 1.2 
standard deviation effect on test score is extremely large, roughly equivalent to falling from 
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the 75th percentile to the 25th. About 4 percent of students in my sample experience a year-
to-year change at least this large. However a 1.2 standard deviation effect could reflect a 0.6 
standard deviation fall from a student who would otherwise have experienced a 0.6 standard 
deviation gain. About 28 percent of my sample experiences a year-to-year score change of at 
least 0.6 standard deviations.  
Table 6. Effect of Special Education on Student Achievement 
Panel 1: Reading score, reading instrument 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Special Education 0.275 0.577 0.291 0.581 
 (0.389) (0.344) (0.386) (0.329) 
F-Statistic 25.35 24.78 25.39 26.03 
N 1199505 1199505 1199505 1199505 
Panel 2: Math score, reading instrument 
Special Education 0.0451 0.171 0.0107 0.249 
 (0.343) (0.320) (0.334) (0.309) 
F-Statistic 25.33 24.77 25.37 26.02 
N 1199496 1199496 1199496 1199496 
Panel 3: Reading score, math instrument 
Special Education -1.827 -0.770 -1.714 -0.685 
 (1.034) (0.484) (0.947) (0.470) 
F-Statistic 5.778 14.28 6.388 14.09 
Panel 4: Math score, math instrument 
Special Education -1.501 -1.289* -1.623 -1.129* 
 (0.941) (0.580) (0.917) (0.555) 
F-Statistic 5.777 14.28 6.388 14.09 
Instruments:     
   Prior Pass*SWD Incentive Y  Y  
   Prior Score*SWD Incentive  Y  Y 
Controls:     
   Levels*Incentive Y Y   
   Levels*Distance*Incentive   Y Y 
Notes: This table displays results from 16 linear IV models following Equation (5), one in each 
column and panel, in which being in special education with a malleable diagnosis is 
instrumented by selection incentives as noted and math or reading z-score is the dependent 
variable. All specifications include demographic controls, year-by-grade fixed effects, and 
school-level fixed effects, and I control for hypothesis 1 incentives as noted. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Kleibergen-Papp F-statistics from the first 
stage are reported. * denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level.  
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The fact that special education can hurt the achievement of some students is 
surprising given prior findings of the effect of special education on achievement. However, 
my results are consistent with the findings by Setren (2016) that students who had a special 
education placement before entering a charter school saw gains similar to those of their non-
special education classmates despite losing special education designations at a fairly high 
rate. The differences between my estimates and those in Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) 
could be driven by differences in settings – location, time period, grades, etc. They could also 
be the result of or differences between the local average treatment effect (LATE) I estimate – 
that of of being placed in (or not being placed in) special education as a result of AYP 
incentives – and the parameters estimated in prior work. 
To investigate the first possibility, I replicate the main analysis from Hanushek, Kain, 
and Rivkin (2002) on my sample of students in North Carolina in the NCLB era. This 
specification uses student fixed effects to control for unobserved differences between those 
who receive special education and those who do not, and measures the effect of special 
education placement on gain scores.15  Here the change in score for student i in grade g in 
school j in year t (∆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is a function of the student’s special education status in that year 
(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), student characteristics (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), school characteristics (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), a student fixed effect 
(𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖), a school fixed effect (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖), cohort by grade dummies (𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), and an error term (𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖): (6) ∆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 +  𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃 +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
 Student characteristics include free or reduced-price lunch eligibility and an indicator 
for whether the student changed schools that year; school characteristics include the 
percentage of students who were Black, the percentage Hispanic, and the percentage eligible 
                                                 
15 I do not have the power necessary to include student fixed effects in my IV analysis. 
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for free or reduced-price lunch. I estimate the model as written, and removing the student 
fixed effects but adding controls for student race and gender.  The resulting estimates appear 
in Table A5. Using this student fixed effect specification, I find small but positive effects of 
special education on student achievement in math, about twice the size of those found by 
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin. However, there is substantial variation across diagnosis groups 
and student ability as defined by third-grade test scores. Students diagnosed with learning 
disabilities or other health impairments experienced especially large gains, while there is no 
significant effect for those with autism. My sample includes a smaller proportion of students 
with learning disabilities and larger proportions with other health impairments (the 
classification used for ADD and ADHD) and autism. Students who scored in lower 
achievement levels in third grade saw greater gains in special education than did those who 
started with higher test scores. Taken together, these suggest that the differences between 
my estimates and those in previous work are not primarily driven by differences in sample.  
6.3 Mechanisms 
Why would my estimates be so different from those found in previous research? My 
estimates reflect the local average treatment effect (LATE) of being placed in (or not being 
placed in) special education as a result of AYP incentives. Recalling Figures 3 and 4, this 
mostly takes the form of students who had previously received a failing score either leaving 
special education or never entering it in the first place. Previous research has focused on the 
average treatment effect (ATE) for students who move in and out of special education or the 
LATE for students who were placed in special education because they were low-performing 
and attended schools that faced accountability pressure under a pre-NCLB system.   
It is possible that the marginal special education students in my setting are harmed 
by the stigma, low-expectations, or lower-achieving peer group in a way that the average 
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special education student is not. It could also be that schools were intentional in pushing 
low-achieving students out of special education, particularly targeting those for whom it was 
the worst fit. These students might be easier to discourage from special education, and any 
gains they experienced by not being in special education could have the added benefit of 
helping the school achieve AYP in other subgroups. It could also be that when schools were 
forced to serve these students’ needs outside of special education they turned to 
alternatives that were even better, or otherwise changed how they supported student 
learning. I explore several possibilities below. I use Equation (4) when considering 
mechanisms operating through school reactions, as I want to capture any potential channels 
through which incentives alter test scores. When considering student reactions to being 
placed in special education, I estimate Equation (5).  
First, I consider whether schools substituted other supports for special education. 
Schools could be particularly likely to do so when trying to discourage special education for 
certain students, so might need to make a case that there is scope to meet the student’s 
needs outside of special education. Supports might include extra time or attention, which is 
not observable in the data, or grade retention, which is. Students who are held back have 
another chance to master that grade’s content. Recent research suggests that being held 
back in third grade improves the performance of students who struggle in reading, by 23% of 
a standard deviation in reading and 30% of a standard deviation in math (Schwerdt, West, & 
Winters, 2017). Students who are held back are also able to take an easier test – say the 4th 
grade test rather than the 5th grade test they would have taken if not held back – on which 
they are compared with younger students. A student taking the 4th grade test rather than 
the 5th grade test would be expected to perform roughly a half standard deviation better 
(North Carolina Public Schools, 2009). Taking these two effects together, a retained student 
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would be expected to receive test scores that were roughly 75 percent of a standard 
deviation better than if they had not been retained. 
Table 7 displays the effect of accountability incentives on the likelihood that a 
student is promoted. I find no evidence that schools respond to selection incentives by 
changing promotion behavior, although schools are more likely to hold back students who 
scored in level 3 in reading when the school would benefit from their passing. 
Table 7. Effect of Accountability Incentives on Being Promoted to the Next Grade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reading Level 2*Incentive -0.000228  0.000139  
 (0.00155)  (0.00149)  
Math Level 2*Incentive 0.000468  0.00276  
 (0.00204)  (0.00166)  
Reading Level 3*Incentive -0.00374*  -0.00345*  
 (0.00173)  (0.00170)  
Math Level 3*Incentive -0.000745  0.00276  
 (0.00128)  (0.00150)  
Reading Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.000462  -0.000183 
  (0.00165)  (0.00159) 
Math Level 2*Distance*Incentive  0.00125  0.00257 
  (0.00227)  (0.00188) 
Reading Level 3*Distance*Incentive  -0.00437*  -0.00446* 
  (0.00204)  (0.00200) 
Math Level 3*Distance*Incentive  -0.000961  0.00227 
  (0.00154)  (0.00192) 
Reading Prior Pass*SWD Incentive -0.00231 -0.00255   
 (0.00282) (0.00286)   
Math Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.00315 0.00383   
 (0.00488) (0.00505)   
Reading Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.00173 0.00179 
   (0.00196) (0.00195) 
Math Prior Score*SWD Incentive   -0.000277 -0.000177 
   (0.00307) (0.00303) 
N 1199720 1199720 1199720 1199720 
Notes: This table displays results from 4 linear probability models following Equation (4), one 
in each column, in which being promoted to the next grade is the dependent variable. Each 
model includes demographic controls, year-by-grade fixed effects, school-level fixed effects, 
and the main effects of school incentives and prior student performance. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the school level. * denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ** at 
the 0.01 level.  
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Table 8. Effect of Accountability Incentives on Changing Schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reading Level 2*Incentive -0.000313  -0.000997  
 (0.00280)  (0.00280)  
Math Level 2*Incentive -0.00629*  -0.00465  
 (0.00291)  (0.00284)  
Reading Level 3*Incentive 0.00302  0.00115  
 (0.00360)  (0.00351)  
Math Level 3*Incentive 0.00424  0.00386  
 (0.00285)  (0.00205)  
Reading Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.000902  -0.00159 
  (0.00305)  (0.00308) 
Math Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.00793*  -0.00556 
  (0.00319)  (0.00327) 
Reading Level 3*Distance*Incentive  0.00235  0.000530 
  (0.00402)  (0.00389) 
Math Level 3*Distance*Incentive  0.00476  0.00451 
  (0.00368)  (0.00262) 
Reading Prior Pass*SWD Incentive -0.00146 -0.00107   
 (0.00414) (0.00417)   
Math Prior Pass*SWD Incentive -0.00372 -0.00453   
 (0.00915) (0.00929)   
Reading Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.00173 0.00179 
   (0.00196) (0.00195) 
Math Prior Score*SWD Incentive   -0.000277 -0.000177 
   (0.00307) (0.00303) 
N 1199737 1199737 1199737 1199737 
Notes: This table displays results from 4 linear probability models following Equation (4), one 
in each column, in which being in a new school in the current year is the dependent variable. 
Each model includes demographic controls, year-by-grade fixed effects, school-level fixed 
effects, and the main effects of school incentives and prior student performance. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. * denotes significance at the 0.05 
level, ** at the 0.01 level. 
 
 Schools could also attempt to change their accountability populations by 
encouraging or discouraging student movement in and out of schools. This could affect 
achievement either if students systematically move into better (or worse) schools or because 
changing schools is generally disruptive. If schools pushed students out (or held on to them) 
anytime a student was placed in special education this would be part of the policy effect of 
being in special education; if it only occurred in the presence of NCLB incentives it would be 
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part of the policy effect of being in special education under NCLB. I examine whether 
previously passing students are more likely to be in a new school when their school faces an 
incentive to alter the SWD population, with results appearing in Table 8. I find no evidence 
that schools respond on this margin when trying to improve the performance of the SWD 
subgroup, although students who previously scored in level 2 in math are more likely to be in 
a new school when their school would benefit from their passing.  
It is also possible that students respond to their placement by changing their level of 
effort. This could be a reaction to stigma or low expectations, which might be particularly 
marked for students whose placements are altered by incentives. While many aspects of 
effort are difficult to observe, I use information on absences to determine whether special 
education affects one fundamental aspect of effort – attendance. This is both an indicator of 
overall effort and an input in itself – previous research suggests that each additional absence 
lowers math achievement scores by 0.05 of a standard deviation (Goodman, 2014). 
The reading incentives form strong instruments in this sample, but the math 
incentives do not, as shown in Table 9. However, their pattern of signs and significance is 
similar to that using the reading incentives as instruments. I find no evidence that special 
education increases overall absences or excused absences, but I do find evidence that it 
increases unexcused absences and instances of being tardy. Using Goodman’s estimates, a 6 
percentage point increase in absences would be expected to lower math achievement by 0.5 
standard deviations.
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Table 9. Effect of Special Education on Attendance  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel 1. Percent of Days Absent       
 -0.0138 3.023 -0.0115 -0.0198 0.140 0.0832 0.146 0.0882 
 (0.0352) (0.0355) (0.0344) (0.0338) (0.103) (0.0651) (0.106) (0.0659) 
Panel 2. Percent of Days Excused Absence      
 -0.00404 -0.0109 -0.00448 -0.0109 0.0462 0.0224 0.0417 0.0209 
 (.0107) (0.0115) (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0300) (0.0173) (0.0281) (0.0174) 
Panel 3. Percent of Days Unexcused Absence     
 0.0203 0.0286* 0.0197 0.0267* 0.0903 0.0619* 0.0859 0.0591* 
 (0.0118) (0.0135) (0.0117) (0.0128) (0.0472) (0.0271) (0.0454) (0.0271) 
Panel 4. Times Tardy per Day Enrolled      
 0.0190* 0.0238* 0.0191* 0.0229* 0.0157 0.0479 0.0493 0.0475 
 (0.00926) (0.0115) (0.00940) (0.0111) (0.0311) (0.0266) (0.0328) (0.0269) 
F-statistic 19.34 18.04 19.56 19.22 4.89 9.881 4.927 9.606 
N 928511 928511 928511 928511 928511 928511 928511 928511 
Instruments:         
 Reading Reading Reading Reading Math Math Math Math 
   Prior Pass * SWD Incentive Y  Y  Y  Y  
   Prior Score * SWD Incentive  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Controls:         
   Levels * Incentive Y Y   Y Y   
   Levels * Distance*Incentive   Y Y   Y Y 
Notes: This table displays results from 24 linear IV models following Equation (5), one in each column and panel, in which being in special 
education with a malleable diagnosis is instrumented by selection incentives as noted. All specifications include demographic controls, year-
by-grade fixed effects, and school-level fixed effects, and I control for hypothesis 1 incentives as noted. Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the school level. Kleibergen-Papp F-statistics from the first stage are reported. * denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 
0.01 level.  
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In sum, I do not find evidence that observable changes in schools’ other investments 
in students drive the negative effects of special education on achievement for marginal 
students. However, it appears that students react to being placed in special education in 
ways that have negative implications for achievement. Prior work has shown that students in 
special education have worse attendance and report lower engagement with school and 
peers (Bear, Clever, and Proctor, 1991, Lackaye and Margalit 2006, Stiefel et al. 2017). My 
results suggest that these differences are at least in part causal rather than purely 
correlational, and highlight the need for a better understanding of how to mitigate the 
negative consequences of special education placement. 
7. Conclusion 
I examine school responses to AYP incentives to classify particular students as 
disabled in order to either target resources to students close to the proficiency threshold or 
to change the composition of the students with disabilities (SWD) subgroup. I use variation 
across schools in their past performance in the subjects and subgroups relevant to AYP, and 
across students in their prior scores and subgroup membership in order to isolate school 
responses.  
I find evidence that schools discourage special education classification for students 
who have previously failed their reading or math test when the school benefits from 
improving the passing rate for the students with disabilities subgroup. I also find evidence 
that schools use special education to target resources to students near the passing threshold 
in reading when the school would benefit from their passing. However, students who just 
passed in math are unaffected, and those who just failed are less likely to be in special 
education when their school would benefit from their passing. This likely reflects two factors. 
First, state accountability rewards schools for the percentage of students passing, without a 
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focus on subgroups or a single high-stakes threshold, so that schools already attempt to 
improve the scores of almost- and just-passing students regardless of AYP incentives. Second, 
North Carolina’s formula for funding special education incentivizes schools to limit the size of 
their special education population, so schools may discourage placement for some in order 
to “make space” for others. 
 While it is important to understand how schools have responded to policy 
incentives, it is not clear what those responses mean for students. Either over classification 
or under classification is at best an inefficiency and at worst an impediment to student 
learning and development. Without knowing the underlying need for special education 
services, it is unclear which prevails. It also is possible for the wrong students to be targeted 
even if neither over classification nor under classification occurs. I find that, for students 
whose placement is driven by their schools’ incentives to alter the SWD population to be 
higher performing in math, special education is harmful to math achievement. Effects on 
reading achievement are consistently negative for this group but not significant. For students 
whose placement is influenced by the school’s incentive to improve the performance of the 
SWD population in reading, there is no significant effect on reading or math scores.  
This raises the question of why special education has different effects on these two 
groups of students. Differences across groups could be driven by differences in either the 
beneficial or detrimental effects of special education placement, or both. One possibility is 
that services and supports unique to special education have more scope to improve the 
performance of students who are low-performing in reading than in math. This seems 
plausible, as reading performance is generally harder for schools to alter, and the alterations 
in the NCEXTEND2 might be especially valuable to struggling readers. Another possibility is 
that schools are better at discouraging placement for students who are low-performing in 
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math but would not be well-served by special education than they are at discouraging 
placement for similar students who are low-performing in reading. This could either be 
because such students are more difficult to identify or because schools have less discretion in 
their placement.  
School reactions to selection incentives mostly take the form of discouraging 
previously low-performing students from entering or remaining in special education.  Thus, 
my results suggest that schools faced with accountability pressure are rationally using special 
education placement to serve their own goals, with benefits to some of the students 
affected. While schools that do not face accountability pressure might also benefit from 
discouraging special education placement for some students, it may be costly to do so. This 
could be because providing alternative supports is expensive and not defrayed by additional 
state funding, because identifying who would do better without special education is difficult, 
or because there are strong pressures to place low-performing students into special 
education. 
My main estimates do not reflect the average benefit of special education for all 
students who receive it, but rather marginal special education students. These are the 
students whose placement can reasonably be altered by the action of stakeholders or 
plausible changes to identification and classification procedures. As such, their experiences 
are the ones relevant for setting accountability policy. Importantly, while the previous 
literature supports a policy of providing as much special education as budgets allowed, my 
finding suggests that placing a student into special education can in fact be harmful to 
achievement. Thus, it is crucial to target special education services to students who will 
benefit from them. 
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These are to my knowledge the first estimates of how schools responded to AYP 
incentives to alter which students received special education. In comparison with earlier 
accountability regimes, NCLB appears to have eliminated one method of gaming the system - 
removing low-achieving students from the accountability population - and replaced it with 
others – targeting special education to students near the passing threshold in reading and 
manipulating subgroup composition. Although NCLB is no longer in force, current 
accountability policies impose similar incentives on schools with a continued emphasis on 
the percentage of students meeting targets and the use of a students with disabilities 
subgroup. These facts – that schools can and will manipulate special education placement in 
the face of NCLB-style incentives and that some students can be hurt by special education 
placement- are important for policymakers and stakeholders to consider as accountability 
and special education policies continue to evolve in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EFFECTS OF DI WAIT TIME ON HEALTH AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING 
1. Introduction 
In order to qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) benefits, applicants must 
demonstrate that they are unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) by 
reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) which can be expected 
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of 
not less than 12 months” (Social Security Act, 1965).  Engaging in SGA is defined as earning 
more than a set amount per month, $1,180 for non-blind individuals in 2018. In 2008, the 
average DI applicant waited about four months for an initial determination. However, 
because those whose claims are denied can appeal that decision at multiple levels, total 
waiting time is often much longer. On average, in 2008 applicants waited over a year for a 
final decision, with around 10 percent of applicants waiting three years or longer (Autor, 
Maestas, Mullen, & Strand, 2015).  
A long wait can mean an extended period out of the labor force as well as delayed 
benefits and insurance coverage. Applicants who are engaging in SGA are not eligible for 
benefits, and employment while waiting for a decision can be used as evidence that the 
applicant is able to work. Beneficiaries are eligible for DI benefits five months after onset or 
after a favorable decision. Although retrospective payments are made for months when the 
beneficiary was waiting for a decision, applicants do not know if they will be awarded 
benefits, or when that award will occur, which may make consumption smoothing difficult 
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for many.16 Applicants who are still waiting for a decision 29 months after disability onset 
would also experience a delay in Medicare coverage. For the 16% of DI applicants who apply 
to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) at the same time, even the average four month wait 
for an initial decision means delayed financial support and insurance coverage, as they would 
receive SSI benefits Medicaid eligibility essentially immediately upon acceptance. For those 
who are ultimately denied there is no compensation for time spent waiting. 
Time out of the labor force, delays in receiving benefits and insurance coverage, and 
uncertainty can all have implications for applicants’ well-being by affecting their daily 
activities, income, and health care access. Staying out of the labor force means time for job 
skills and labor force attachment to decay. It could lower well-being through a drop in 
income, which limits both consumption and applicants ability to spend money to improve 
their health, and loss of employer-based health insurance. However, it could allow applicants 
to invest more time in their health, which might be particularly important when recovering 
from an illness or adjusting to new impairments. There is some evidence that receiving DI for 
a short period of time increases earnings for those who are subsequently removed from the 
program, which might be explained by this opportunity to invest time in health at a crucial 
moment (Moore, 2015). Delayed benefits mean lower income, at least temporarily, while 
delayed Medicare or Medicaid coverage could harm both health care access and financial 
well-being, as applicants are forced to either forgo insurance coverage or pay for more 
expensive, and perhaps less comprehensive, coverage (Gross & Notowidigo, 2011).17  
                                                 
16 In a survey of 2008 DI awardees, 80% reported that waiting for benefits had affected their finances. 
Two thirds of these reported relying on assistance from friends, family, and charity, while 40% took on 
debt (SSA 2009). 
17 Analyses using a similar data set to that used here found that almost a quarter of beneficiaries were 
without insurance coverage in the year before application, 37 percent had insurance from their own 
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Research suggests that health insurance improves access to health care, as well as some 
components of health (Currie & Gruber, 1996, Michalopoulos et al., 2011, Finkelstein et al., 
2012, Baicker et al., 2013). This may be especially important for DI applicants, who by 
definition have a serious health care condition.  
A well-established literature has estimated the effect of DI on applicants’ and 
beneficiaries’ labor force participation and earnings (Bound, 1989, Chen & van der Klaauw, 
2008, Maestas Mullen & Strand, 2013, French & Song, 2014, Gelber, Moore & Strand, 2017). 
Less is known about the effects of DI on other outcomes. In a recent working paper Gelber, 
Moore & Strand (2018) find that larger benefit amounts decrease mortality among 
beneficiaries in the first five years after allowance. As discussed above, research also 
suggests that, for those who lose eligibility for benefits, having received benefits for about 
three years can increase earnings compared with those who have been on for a very short 
time (Moore, 2015). An analysis of changes to the Dutch DI system suggests that changes to 
income and work can have implications for the health of DI beneficiaries. However, the 
Dutch systems of DI and social support are quite different from those in the US, so this work 
provides limited insights into the US system (Garcia-Gomez & Gielen, 2014). 
Wait time appears to play a substantial role in the effect of DI - taking wait time into 
account increases the effect of DI on employment by about 50%, suggesting that the 
previous consensus understated the impact of the program substantially (Autor et al., 2015). 
Long waits force applicants to change their behaviors in order to fund consumption. Coe, 
Lindner, Wong, & Wu (2013) investigate the coping strategies that applicants use, and find 
that longer waiting times increase SNAP usage while decreasing the use of unemployment 
                                                 
employer, and 33 percent had insurance through a spouse’s employer (Livermore, Stapleton, and 
Claypool, 2009). 
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insurance and the likelihood of changing addresses. Despite these indications that waiting 
time is important to well-being, to my knowledge no other research has addressed the effect 
of DI wait time in a setting that allows for causal inference.  
I address this gap in the literature using the restricted 1997-2005 National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS) linked to two SSA administrative files – the Master Beneficiary 
Record (MBR) and 831 File – through 2007 to examine the effects of waiting time on health, 
health care access, and financial well-being.  This linked data combine the relative accuracy 
and programmatic detail of administrative records with a rich description of well-being 
available only in survey data. 
 Individual wait time depends in part on the characteristics and choices of applicants. To 
simply compare the outcomes of those with different wait times would conflate the effect of 
time waiting for a decision with these factors. Instead, I use information on the number of 
pending applications and number of decisions made to construct expected wait times by 
state and month of application, and use these as instruments for individual wait time.  This 
allows me to isolate the variation in wait time that is caused by factors beyond the 
individual’s control, such as differences in processing speed or backlogs from earlier 
applications. 
I find evidence that wait time increases the likelihood of currently receiving benefits at 
the time of survey and decreases that of having had benefits terminated. This is broadly 
consistent with previous findings that wait time decreases employment and earnings, and 
would be expected if a longer wait makes the return to work more difficult. I find that wait 
time decreases the likelihood of seeking a reconsideration. I also find evidence that wait time 
increases the number of conditions causing activity limitations. This may point to one of the 
ways in which wait times impede return to work, but also demonstrates that wait time has 
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implications for beneficiaries’ well-being that are not confined to workforce outcomes. I do 
not find significant effects of wait time on other outcomes, although point estimates suggest 
that wait time increases BMI, has no effect on mental health, and increases poverty. 
Ultimately, I am limited in my ability to identify the effects of wait time by sample size.  
My results provide evidence that the effects of DI, and of wait time in particular, are not 
limited to workforce outcomes. Researchers have so far focused on these work and earnings 
because they are convenient to study. However, while employment and earnings are 
important, they are insufficient to characterize well-being or to measure the impact or value 
of DI.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and samples 
constructed. In Section 4 I describe the method used, and in Section 5 the results. Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Data and Sample 
2.1 Data Sources 
I use linked data that includes information from the 1997-2005 National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS), the NHIS restricted access mortality file through 2011, and two SSA 
administrative files – the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR) and 831 File – through 2007. The 
NHIS is a cross-sectional household survey that covers the civilian non-instutionalized 
population of the United States (National Center for Health Statistics, 2006). Respondents 
are asked to provide their social security numbers and consent to have their survey 
responses linked to other data. From the survey I draw information on demographics, state 
of residence, and a host of indicators of health, health care access, and financial well-being. 
Because many of the indicators of health care access measure similar concepts, I create an 
index of health care access. To create the index I count the number of questions about health 
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care access with non-missing data for each respondent, as well as the number of questions 
on which the respondent reported a barrier to access18. I then divide latter number by the 
former number, resulting in an index runs from 0 to 1. 
 The MBR and 831 files are used by the Social Security Adminstration for program 
operations. The MBR includes information, in many cases monthly, on all individuals who 
apply for DI or for retirement benefits from SSA. The 831 file is focused on the determination 
process for those who apply to either DI or SSI. My extract of these files includes only those 
individuals who are matched to the NHIS data and appear in both the MBR and the 831 file. 
Crucially, the files record the dates on which applications were submitted, and decisions 
made. They also include information on primary disabling conditions, month-by-month 
program status, and other programmatic details. 
2.2 Sample 
The linked data provides information for all NHIS respondents who provided SSNs 
and consented to be linked, for whom a successful link was performed, and who applied to 
DI between 1988 and 2007. From this file I construct a sample that includes those who 
applied before interview. For my analyses I use an instrument defined using summary 
statistics on the number of applications received and processed in each state and month. 
This information is only available beginning in October 2000, so my sample is further 
restricted to those with an application on or after that month. For individuals with more than 
one application I find the most recent initial application at time of survey and consider this as 
                                                 
18 These questions include: whether the respondent has seen a dentist in the past 12 months; whether 
prescription medicine, mental health care, dental care, or medical care were needed but could not be 
afforded; whether care was delayed due to cost; whether the respondent has a usual place for care; 
whether the respondent has no form of health insurance; and whether the household paid $500 or 
more out of pocket in the past year.  
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their application of interest19. I identify the initial decision as the earliest decision associated 
with that initial application date, and note all decisions associated with that application date 
recorded in the 831 file.20 I drop the handful of applications considered under the Quick 
Disability Determination program and other special expedited processes. I also drop those 
for whom the wait time for the initial decision cannot be determined due to missing or 
inconsistent information, those with negative wait times, and those with wait times in the 
top 1%. These final two restrictions come from an assumption that implausible wait times 
are more likely to be reflective of data errors than truth, and that very extreme waits are 
unlikely to be driven by variation in expected wait times.  
The main sample includes 2,155 individuals who applied for benefits from October 
2000 to December 2005. On average, they were 47.5 years old at survey and 46 at 
application, as shown in Table 10. Over a third of applicants had a musculoskeletal primary 
disabling condition and 22 percent had a mental health condition as their primary diagnosis. 
On average, they faced a 102 day initial wait time, about 3 ½ months, although this average 
camouflages the long right tail in wait times. This is more apparent in Figure 5, which depicts 
the distribution of initial wait times, top coded at 300 days.  
  
                                                 
19 Applications begin with an initial application and initial decision. Individuals whose claims were 
rejected could continue to pursue their applications though several levels of appeal. They can also 
resubmit their claim after a period of time. 
20 Unfortunately, the 831 file does not record detailed information on most appeals beyond the 
reconsideration step. The MBR contains some information on these decisions, but my extract of the 
file does not include them in the format needed to accurately trace their path. 
64 
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics – Demographics and Wait Time 
 N Mean SD 
Age at Survey 2,143 47.455 11.907 
Age at Application 2,143 45.914 11.836 
Male 2,148 0.476 0.500 
Race/Ethnicity    
   White 2,155 0.477 0.500 
   African American 2,155 0.177 0.382 
   Hispanic 2,155 0.162 0.369 
   Other 2,155 0.183 0.387 
Education    
   < HS 2,155 0.220 0.414 
   HS or GED 2,155 0.325 0.468 
   > HS 2,155 0.237 0.425 
   Unknown 2,155 0.219 0.413 
Marital Status    
   Married/Partnered 2,155 0.578 0.494 
   Widowed 2,155 0.049 0.216 
   Divorced/Separated 2,155 0.208 0.406 
   Never Married 2,155 0.162 0.368 
  Unknown 2,155 0.002 0.048 
Primary Disabling Condition    
   Musculoskeletal 2,155 0.345 0.476 
   Senses and Speech 2,155 0.026 0.159 
   Respiratory 2,155 0.045 0.208 
   Cardiovascular 2,155 0.095 0.293 
   Digestive 2,155 0.022 0.148 
   Genito-urinary System 2,155 0.013 0.113 
   Endocrine 2,155 0.050 0.217 
   Neurological 2,155 0.075 0.263 
   Mental 2,155 0.222 0.416 
   Neoplastic 2,155 0.032 0.175 
   Immune  2,155 0.017 0.130 
   Other 2,155 0.046 0.210 
Initial Wait 2,155 102.357 56.627 
Reconsideration  2,155 0.361 0.481 
Initial + Reconsideration Wait 2,155 146.339 102.442 
Reports Applying for SSDI 2,134 0.724 0.447 
Reports Applying for SSI 2,131 0.363 0.481 
Applied for SSI 2,155 0.550 0.498 
Correctly Reports SSI application 2,131 0.618 0.486 
Notes:  Table presents descriptive statistics on analytic sample constructed from the 1997-
2005 NHIS linked to 1989-2005 SSA administrative records.
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Figure 5. Distribution of Initial Wait Times 
Notes: Figure displays the fraction of applicants who fall into 10-day initial wait bins, with the 
top bin containing those whose waits were 300 days or longer. 
 Linking survey data to administrative records allows me to evaluate how accurately 
survey respondents reported their application behavior. Although all sample members had 
applied for DI at the time of survey, less than 75% reported doing so. A little more than half 
had applied for SSI at the time of survey, but about a third reported doing so. Only around 61 
percent correctly reported their SSI application status. These inaccuracies are part of the 
reason administrative data is crucial to analyzing beneficiary experiences.  
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Table 11. Descriptive Statistics – Program Status, Health, and Well-being 
 N Mean SD 
Benefit Status at Survey    
   Current 2,155 0.591 0.492 
   Suspended 2,155 0.009 0.094 
   Terminated 2,155 0.064 0.244 
   Never Benefits 2,155 0.337 0.473 
# of Activity Limitations 2,155 1.698 1.914 
# of Functional Limitations 2,155 1.048 1.689 
Good or Better Health 2,151 0.397 0.489 
>20 bed days 1,073 0.333 0.471 
Number MH symptoms 1,130 1.325 1.924 
Any MH symptoms 1,130 0.443 0.497 
BMI 1,139 36.337 20.134 
Dentist Past 12 Months 1,124 0.459 0.499 
Unable to afford needed:    
   Prescription medicine 1,129 0.324 0.468 
   Mental health care 1,127 0.147 0.355 
   Dental Care 1,128 0.318 0.466 
    Needed Medical Care 2,151 0.313 0.464 
Delayed Care - Financial 2,152 0.346 0.476 
Has a Usual Place for Care 1,116 0.899 0.302 
No Health Insurance 2,143 0.247 0.431 
Working Last Week 2,144 0.171 0.376 
SNAP 2,142 0.208 0.406 
>$500 out of pocket 2,110 0.580 0.494 
< 100% FPL 1,735 0.285 0.451 
Dead by 12/31/2011 2,155 0.146 0.353 
Notes:  Table presents descriptive statistics on analytic sample constructed from the 1997-
2005 NHIS linked to 1989-2005 SSA administrative records
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Table 11 details sample sizes, means, and standard deviations for program status and 
the various measures of health, health care access, and financial well-being.  At the time of 
survey about 60 percent were receiving DI benefits, 1 percent had benefits suspended, 6 
percent had benefits terminated, and the remainder had never had benefits. About 40 
percent reported being in good or better health. About 45 percent reported that they 
experienced at least one symptom of depression always or often, suggesting that many more 
than the 22 percent of sample members who had a mental health condition as their primary 
diagnosis might benefit from mental health care. In the year prior to interview, 46 had seen a 
dentist, 32 percent had been unable to afford prescription medicine, 15 percent mental 
health care, and 32 percent dental care. Thirty one percent had had some family member 
forgo needed medical care because it was too expensive. Thirty five percent had delayed 
medical care due to cost. About a quarter did not have health insurance at the time of 
survey. Despite these barriers, only 10 percent did not have a usual place for care. Almost 30 
percent had family income at or below the Federal Poverty Level, and about 15 percent had 
died by the end of 2011. 
3. Method  
Simply comparing the outcomes and characteristics of those with shorter and longer 
wait times would conflate the true effects of waiting for a decision and the circumstances 
that cause some to face longer waits than others. Wait times vary across individuals both for 
reasons associated with that individual’s outcomes, such as impairment, job prospects, or 
choices to pursue initially denied applications, and those that are not, such as examiner 
speed, determination office staffing, and previous caseloads.  In order to identify the causal 
effect of wait time on outcomes it is necessary to isolate the variation caused by the latter 
factors. To do so I use publicly available information on the number of decisions and pending 
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applications for each state for each month from October 2000 to the present to construct 
the expected wait times for an initial decision that prevailed when and where the application 
was made, and use these as instruments.  
(1) 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−1𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠   
The expected wait (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚) for state s year y and month m is the number of pending 
applications for that state at the end of month m-1 divided by the number of decisions made 
in month m. This reflects the number of months it would take the Disability Determination 
Service to process an application submitted at the beginning of month m, assuming 
applications are considered in the order they are received and decisions are made at the rate 
that prevails in that month. The distribution of expected wait times is depicted in Figure A1. 
(2) 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 +  𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚 + 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚  
(3) 𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝚤𝚤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� +  𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚 + 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 
I use this instrument in a standard linear IV framework. In the first stage, wait time 
for individual i who applies in state s, year y, and month m (𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚) is estimated based on 
individual demographics (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚), the instrument for expected wait (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚), state, 
year, and month fixed effects, the unemployment rate (𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚), and a random error. In 
the second stage, actual individual wait time is replaced by the estimated wait time 
produced by the first stage (𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝚤𝚤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� ). I report estimates with and without a control for the 
expected wait time from the previous month (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚−1). Standard errors are clustered 
at the state level.  
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My estimates reflect the causal effects of wait time if, conditional on controls, 
individuals who applied in state-months with different expected wait times would have the 
same outcomes were it not for the wait they face.  In addition to demographics, (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚) I 
control for several other factors that might cause correlation between expected waits and 
individual outcomes. First, some states, months, and years have higher wait times in general, 
which may be correlated with unobserved differences in other characteristics. For example, 
applicants in December may be different from those in other months, and also face different 
wait times. I address this concern by including fixed effects for state, month, and year of 
application.  
Second, applicants could know something about wait times and decide when to 
apply based on that information. This is unlikely to be a major factor for those who are not 
working just before application, but could be a consideration for disabled workers deciding 
to leave a job and pursue DI benefits. To address this issue, I make use of the fact that 
individuals do not know the wait they will face in advance, as summary data cannot be 
published until after the month has ended. Instead, individuals attempting to time their 
applications would have to rely on information on previous waits or previous backlogs to 
form their expectations. I include estimates that control for a 1-month lagged expected wait, 
reflecting what an applicant’s best guess of their own wait time might be.  
Third, applications generally increase when employment prospects are poor, 
lengthening wait times (Autor and Duggan, 2003). This is a problem both because the 
applicants who are induced to apply by poor economic conditions are probably different 
from other applicants and because the state of the economy can have independent effects 
on some of the outcomes I consider. I address this in two ways. First, I include a control for 
the unemployment rate in the state, year, and month of application to capture month-to-
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month variation in economic trends. While unemployment does not fully capture applicants’ 
job prospects it should be at least correlated with month-to-month changes in economic 
conditions. Second, to the extent that economic conditions evolve somewhat smoothly over 
time, the inclusion of lagged wait time should control for the effect of a similar economic 
situation, as it is reflected in wait time.  
4. Results 
4.1 First Stage  
I begin by evaluating the strength of my instrument, with the results displayed in Table 
12. Kleibergen-Papp F-statistics appear at the bottom of the table and are greater than 10 for 
the full sample. An additional month of expected wait causes 16.87 days of additional wait, 
as shown in column 1. After controlling for lagged wait, an additional month of expected wait 
causes 12.15 days of individual wait, reflecting serial correlation in waits.   
Table 12. First Stage 
 (5) (6) 
   
Instrument 16.87** 12.15** 
 (3.566) (2.622) 
Lagged Instrument  9.982** 
  (2.575) 
   
N 1,757 1,700 
F-Stat 33.12 41.41 
   
Lagged Wait Time N Y 
Notes: Table reports results from 2 linear regressions of individual initial wait time on 
instruments. Each regression includes controls for age, age squared, sex, education, 
race/ethnicity, marital status, primary diagnosis, and the unemployment rate in the state and 
month of application. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The Kleibergen-Paap F-
statistic on the instrument is reported at the bottom of the table. + denotes significance at 
the 0.1 level, * at the 0.05 level, and ** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 13. Effects of Wait Time on Program Status 
  Benefit Status at Survey  
 Ever SSDI Current Suspended Terminated 
Never 
Benefits 
Any Re- 
consideration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel 1 – No Lag 
Wait -0.00027 0.0013 0.00023 -0.0014* -0.00014 -0.0024* 
 (0.00073) (0.0010) (0.00026) (0.00058) (0.00078) (0.0010) 
       
F-statistic 33.12 33.12 33.12 33.12 33.12 33.12 
N 2132 2132 2132 2132 2132 2132 
Panel 2 – 1 Month Lag 
Wait 0.00026 0.0026* 0.000050 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0032* 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.00038) (0.00080) (0.00095) (0.0013) 
       
F-statistic 41.41 41.41 41.41 41.41 41.41 41.41 
N 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 
Notes: Table reports the estimates of the effect of wait time on outcomes, from 12 IV 
regressions. The second panel controls for 1-month lagged wait time. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic on the instrument is reported at the 
bottom of each panel. + denotes significance at the 0.1 level, * at the 0.05 level, and ** at 
the 0.01 level. 
4.2 Effects of Wait Time 
Table 13 displays IV estimates of the effect of wait time on program status. The 
estimates in Panel 2 include a control for the previous month’s wait time, while those in 
Panel 1 do not. An additional day of wait time increases the likelihood of having benefits 
terminated at the time of survey by 0.14 percentage points, or about 2 percent. Most 
terminations occur due to death or aging out of the program. No one in my sample has died 
at the time of survey and the regression controls for age, so these effects must be driven by 
other terminations, such as those for work or medical recovery. Having benefits terminated 
for these reasons often takes time, so this could simply reflect the fact that those who face 
longer initial waits have received benefits for less time. It could also reflect changes to 
underlying factors, such as health or willingness and ability to work. It is worth noting that 
the effect of wait time on terminated status is not significant after controlling for lagged 
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wait, although the point estimate is reasonably close, and I find an increased likelihood of 
having current benefits at the time of survey. This leads me to believe that the loss of 
significance is result of a loss of power.  
Longer wait times also decreased the likelihood of seeking a reconsideration by 0.24 
percentage points when not controlling for lagged wait time, a 0.7 percent change. This is in 
contrast to the finding that wait time increased reconsiderations in Autor et al. (2015). The 
source of this difference is unclear, but it may result from differences in instrument. Their 
instrument identifies the effect of examiner speed, after controlling for average speed in the 
state, month and year of application. It seems possible that absolute wait time decreases 
reconsiderations, perhaps because applicants cannot afford to continue, but wait time 
relative to peers increases reconsiderations, because applicants interpret their long wait as a 
signal that theirs was a close decision that is likely to be overturned. 
I do not find a significant effect on the likelihood of having ever received benefits at the 
time of survey, or of having benefits suspended. The point estimates are quite small and vary 
considerably across specifications. Greater precision would be needed to determine the 
effect of wait time on these outcomes. Estimates using survey weights appear in Table A.7 
They are largely similar to those without weights, except that I find a marginally significant 
effect of wait time on ever having had benefits by the time of survey when controlling for 
lagged wait. 
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Table 14. Effects of Wait Time on Health and Well-Being 
 
Activity 
Limitations 
Functional 
Limitations 
Good or 
Better 
Health 
Bed 
Days BMI 
Mental 
Health 
Symptoms 
Health 
Care 
Access 
Index SNAP 
<= 100% 
FPL 
Working 
Last Week 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel 1 – No Lag 
Wait 0.0077* 0.0052 -0.00076 0.25 0.026 0.00013 -0.0010 -0.00033 0.00061 -0.00028 
 (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0018) (0.69) (0.020) (0.0016) (0.00091) (0.00091) (0.0012) (0.00080) 
           
F-statistic 33.12 33.12 32.40 10.40 8.286 10.33 7.576 30.45 29.58 31.29 
N 2132 2132 2128 1131 969 1122 1079 2120 1718 2121 
Panel 2 – 1 Month Lag 
Wait 0.014** 0.0049 -0.0013 -0.040 0.030 0.00066 -0.00075 -0.000034 0.0019 0.000036 
 (0.0037) (0.0060) (0.0018) (1.32) (0.030) (0.0026) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
           
F-statistic 41.41 41.41 40.50 9.513 7.814 9.379 6.013 37.87 34.45 37.53 
N 2065 2065 2061 1089 933 1080 1038 2053 1663 2055 
Notes: Table reports the estimates of the effect of wait time on outcomes, from 20 IV regressions. The second panel controls for 1-month 
lagged wait time. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic on the instrument is reported at the bottom of 
each panel. + denotes significance at the 0.1 level, * at the 0.05 level, and ** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 14 presents estimates of the effect of wait time on health, health care access, and 
financial well-being, following the same structure as in the previous table. I find that an 
additional month of wait increases the number of conditions that cause activity limitations 
by about 0.2. The average respondent reports 1.7 such conditions, so this is a sizable 
increase, and controlling for 1-month lagged wait time doubles the estimated coefficient. I 
do not find significant effects of wait time on the number of conditions causing functional 
limitations, having good or better health, the number of bed days, BMI, or experiencing at 
least one depression symptom often or always. In some cases these point estimates would 
be meaningful if more precisely estimated. For example, more precise estimates would allow 
me to conclude that wait time has a substantial effect on the number of bed days, and no 
effect on the likelihood of reporting depression symptoms. Instead, I am unable to state with 
confidence that waiting has any effect on bed days, and cannot rule out changes to 
depression symptoms as large as 20 percent from an additional month of wait time.  
The remainder of Table 14 displays estimates of the effect of wait time on the health 
care index, receiving SNAP in the previous year, having household income at or below 100% 
of the Federal Poverty Level, and working in the week previous to survey. None of these 
results are significantly different from zero. In most cases the point estimates suggest that 
wait time does not have an economically meaningful effect, but they are too imprecisely 
estimated to say this with confidence. The exception to this rule is poverty. Focusing on the 
results with a control for 1-month lagged wait time, the point estimate suggests that an 
additional month of waiting increases the likelihood of having a family income at or below 
FPL by about 6 percentage points, or 20 percent. Unfortunately, this estimate is very 
imprecise, so I am unable to rule out increases as large as 13 percentage points or decreases 
as large as 2 percentage points. Using survey weights does not substantively change these 
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results, as shown in Table A.8. I also find a similar pattern for each of the components of the 
health care access index, results for which appear in Table A.9. 
It is likely that wait time matters more for some applicants than for others. For example, 
ultimately denied applicants never receive any compensation for their time waiting for a 
decision, while those who eventually receive benefits can receive back payments. Those with 
a spouse, especially a working spouse, may be better able to cope financially and have an 
easier time obtaining health insurance. This would be consistent with the finding by Coe et 
al. (2013) that applicants with employed spouses had longer wait times. Unfortunately, the 
size of my sample does not provide the power needed to investigate effects of wait time on 
most subgroups. 
5. Conclusion 
As of February 2018, over 10 million individuals received benefits from the DI 
program, totaling nearly $11 billion in that month alone (SSA 2018). Little work has 
addressed the relationship between the DI program and outcomes other than employment, 
or the effects of the application process.  
I use an instrumental variables strategy to estimate the effect of waiting for a 
decision on health, health care access, and other measures of well-being. I find that wait time 
decreases the likelihood of having had benefits terminated at the time of survey and 
increases the likelihood of currently receiving benefits at survey. I also find that a longer wait 
decreases the likelihood of asking for a reconsideration of a denied claim, and increases the 
number of conditions causing activity limitations. The sample I use is quite small, resulting in 
limited power. I find suggestive evidence that wait time effects some other outcomes, such 
as poverty and BMI, and does not affect others, such as mental health, but am unable to rule 
out alternate conclusions with confidence. 
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My analyses carry several additional limitations. Wait time exhibits a long right tail, 
but the instrument does not, making it unsuitable to investigate the effects of particularly 
long waits. I am also unable to address the effect on subsamples, as doing so results in very 
weak instruments. Finally, the effects captured here are relatively short-term. My sample 
applied for benefits no earlier than 2000, and were surveyed no later than 2005. If the effect 
of wait time changes over time, I am unable to comment on that here.  
Despite these limitations, my findings highlight the fact that DI, and its wait time, 
affect more than work and earnings. Many applicants are not marginal workers. Even for 
those who are, the experience DI is not well summarized by decisions of whether to work 
and how much to earn. Focusing only on these outcomes makes it impossible to take account 
of the full value and cost of DI and other programs. It also does not provide answers to why 
programs have the labor market effects they do, which can be crucial to improving policy.  
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APPENDIX  
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Figure A1. Distribution of Expected Wait Time Instrument 
Notes: Figure displays the fraction of applicants whose expected wait time instrument falls 
into 10-day initial wait bins, with the top bin containing those whose expected waits were 
150 days or longer.
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Table A.1 Effect of Accountability Incentives on Special Education Placement by Percentage in Special Education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Reading Level 2*Incentive 0.0113**  0.00530  0.0179**  0.0142**  
 (0.00420)  (0.00387)  (0.00412)  (0.00389)  
Math Level 2*Incentive -0.0156**  -0.0163**  -0.00755  -0.0104**  
 (0.00486)  (0.00415)  (0.00471)  (0.00393)  
Reading Level 3*Incentive 0.0228**  0.0223**  0.0312**  0.0290**  
 (0.00378)  (0.00364)  (0.00423)  (0.00392)  
Math Level 3*Incentive -0.00232  -0.00213  -0.00117  0.000735  
 (0.00272)  (0.00314)  (0.00242)  (0.00283)  
Reading Level 2*Distance*Incentive  0.0111*  0.00567  0.0187**  0.0159** 
  (0.00443)  (0.00409)  (0.00437)  (0.00414) 
Math Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.0186**  -0.0179**  -0.00914  -0.0103* 
  (0.00533)  (0.00459)  (0.00522)  (0.00443) 
Reading Level 3*Distance*Incentive  0.0244**  0.0261**  0.0354**  0.0349** 
  (0.00427)  (0.00416)  (0.00475)  (0.00450) 
Math Level 3*Distance*Incentive  -0.00579  -0.00237  -0.00392  0.00182 
  (0.00327)  (0.00387)  (0.00290)  (0.00361) 
Reading Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.00882 0.00860   0.0132* 0.0128*   
 (0.00573) (0.00575)   (0.00573) (0.00574)   
Math Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.0157 0.0174   0.0230* 0.0249*   
 (0.00955) (0.00982)   (0.00970) (0.01000)   
Reading Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.00329 0.00361   0.00551 0.00585 
   (0.00308) (0.00312)   (0.00312) (0.00316) 
Math Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.00947** 0.0100**   0.0113** 0.0119** 
   (0.00315) (0.00329)   (0.00323) (0.00338) 
N 625785 625785 625785 625785 573952 573952 573952 573952 
Sample >= 12.5 >= 12.5 >= 12.5 >= 12.5 <12.5 <12.5 <12.5 <12.5 
Notes: This table displays results from 8 linear probability models following Equation (4), one in each column, in which being in special education with a 
malleable diagnosis is the dependent variable. Each model includes demographic controls, year-by-grade fixed effects, school-level fixed effects, and the main 
effects of school incentives and prior student performance. The sample is divided by whether the school had more or less than 12.5 percent of its student body 
in special education. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. * denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level.  
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Table A.2 Effect of Accountability Incentives on Malleable Diagnoses, Including Those with 
Non-Malleable Diagnoses in Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reading Level 2*Incentive 0.0115**  0.00685**  
 (0.00274)  (0.00259)  
Math Level 2*Incentive -0.0127**  -0.0139**  
 (0.00320)  (0.00279)  
Reading Level 3*Incentive 0.0220**  0.0204**  
 (0.00266)  (0.00253)  
Math Level 3*Incentive -0.00289  -0.00210  
 (0.00183)  (0.00203)  
Reading Level 2*Distance*Incentive  0.0115**  0.00744** 
  (0.00290)  (0.00274) 
Math Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.0146**  -0.0150** 
  (0.00351)  (0.00308) 
Reading Level 3*Distance*Incentive  0.0241**  0.0241** 
  (0.00300)  (0.00290) 
Math Level 3*Distance*Incentive  -0.00570**  -0.00247 
  (0.00220)  (0.00250) 
Reading Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.0193** 0.0194**   
 (0.00438) (0.00442)   
Math Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.0123 0.0140*   
 (0.00638) (0.00661)   
Reading Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.00964** 0.0101** 
   (0.00235) (0.00238) 
Math Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.00652** 0.00661** 
   (0.00233) (0.00240) 
N 1237846 1237846 1237846 1237846 
Notes: This table displays results from 4 linear probability models following Equation (4), one 
in each column, in which being in special education with a malleable diagnosis is the 
dependent variable. Each model includes demographic controls, year-by-grade fixed effects, 
school-level fixed effects, and the main effects of school incentives and prior student 
performance. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. * denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level.  
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Table A.3 Descriptive Statistics for Students with Non-Malleable Diagnoses 
 Mean SD 
Special Education 1 0 
Prior Pass Reading 0.351838 0.47755 
Prior Pass Math 0.399542 0.489811 
Native American 0.03758 0.19018 
Asian 0.008678 0.092753 
Hispanic 0.075343 0.263948 
Black 0.445011 0.496974 
White 0.406301 0.491149 
Other 0.027087 0.162338 
Female 0.345264 0.475461 
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch 0.714748 0.451541 
School failed in math 0.281229 0.449605 
School failed in reading 0.231421 0.421746 
Math Score -0.83819 1.111153 
Prior math score -0.87208 1.185548 
Reading Score -0.70621 1.198559 
Prior reading score -0.79773 1.21959 
N 38,026  
Notes: Table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of students with non-malleable 
diagnoses. These students are excluded from the main analysis sample. Current and prior 
test scores are presented in standard deviation units. 
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Table A.4 Effect of Accountability Incentives on Special Education Placement – Non-Title I 
Schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reading Level 2*Incentive -0.0492**  -0.0418**  
 (0.0156)  (0.0130)  
Math Level 2*Incentive -0.0149  -0.0207**  
 (0.00765)  (0.00655)  
Reading Level 3*Incentive -0.00528  -0.0156  
 (0.00643)  (0.00866)  
Math Level 3*Incentive 0.00594  0.00508  
 (0.00531)  (0.00463)  
Reading Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.0566**  -0.0490** 
  (0.0166)  (0.0138) 
Math Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.0182*  -0.0232** 
  (0.00893)  (0.00765) 
Reading Level 3*Distance*Incentive  -0.00867  -0.0205* 
  (0.00730)  (0.0100) 
Math Level 3*Distance*Incentive  0.00338  0.00585 
  (0.00598)  (0.00552) 
Reading Prior Pass*SWD Incentive -0.0556* -0.0547*   
 (0.0245) (0.0246)   
Math Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.0289 0.0323   
 (0.0198) (0.0202)   
Reading Prior Score*SWD Incentive   -0.0172 -0.0177* 
   (0.00884) (0.00893) 
Math Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.0156* 0.0164* 
   (0.00767) (0.00790) 
N 1047084 1047084 1047084 1047084 
Notes: This table displays results from 4 linear probability models following Equation (4), one 
in each column, in which being in special education with a malleable diagnosis is the 
dependent variable. Each model includes demographic controls, year-by-grade fixed effects, 
school-level fixed effects, and the main effects of school incentives and prior student 
performance. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. * denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level.  
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Table A.5 Effects of Special Education on Gains in Math Scores, Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin 
model 
 No Student FE Student FE N 
 (1) (2)  
All 0.0261** 0.0663** 2,311,728 
 (0.0028) (0.0068)  
Diagnosis    
Learning Disabled 0.0635** 0.0930** 157,442 
 (0.0052) (0.0107)  
Speech/Language 0.0272** 0.0280* 70,901 
 (0.0051) (0.0126)  
Emotional/Behavioral 0.0923** 0.1030 14,560 
 (0.0213) (0.0527)  
Other Health (ADHD) 0.0818** 0.1065** 72,986 
 (0.0087) (0.0192)  
Autism 0.0429 0.0865 17,071 
 (0.0323) (0.0801)  
Previous Achievement Level    
1 0.0563** 0.1991** 68,653 
 (0.0061) (0.0223)  
2 -0.0027 0.1461** 248,366 
 (0.0035) (0.0129)  
3 -0.0717** 0.0723** 673,307 
 (0.0028) (0.0094)  
4 -0.1672** 0.0297 320,893 
 (0.0081) (0.0163)  
Notes: This table presents the results of 20 models following Equation (6), in which the gain 
in math z-score is the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the school level. A * denotes significance at the 0.05 level and **denotes significance at the 
0.01 level. 
 
  
87 
 
Table A.6 Effect of Accountability Incentives on Special Education Placement – Alternate 
Malleable Definition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reading Level 2*Incentive 0.0167**  0.0108**  
 (0.00337)  (0.00312)  
Math Level 2*Incentive -0.0118**  -0.0144**  
 (0.00397)  (0.00332)  
Reading Level 3*Incentive 0.0281**  0.0264**  
 (0.00328)  (0.00313)  
Math Level 3*Incentive 0.000585  0.000593  
 (0.00220)  (0.00247)  
Reading Level 2*Distance*Incentive  0.0165**  0.0115** 
  (0.00357)  (0.00331) 
Math Level 2*Distance*Incentive  -0.0147**  -0.0151** 
  (0.00438)  (0.00372) 
Reading Level 3*Distance*Incentive  0.0306**  0.0312** 
  (0.00372)  (0.00360) 
Math Level 3*Distance*Incentive  -0.00250  0.00151 
  (0.00264)  (0.00310) 
Reading Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.0261** 0.0262**   
 (0.00543) (0.00555)   
Math Prior Pass*SWD Incentive 0.0163 0.0177*   
 (0.00854) (0.00888)   
Reading Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.0127** 0.0133** 
   (0.00307) (0.00311) 
Math Prior Score*SWD Incentive   0.00841** 0.00873** 
   (0.00308) (0.00321) 
N 1199737 1199737 1199737 1199737 
Notes: This table displays results from 4 linear probability models following Equation (4), one 
in each column, in which being in special education with a malleable or autism diagnosis is 
the dependent variable. Each model includes demographic controls, year-by-grade fixed 
effects, school-level fixed effects, and the main effects of school incentives and prior student 
performance. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. * denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level.  
 
  
88 
 
Table A7. Effects of Wait Time on Program Status, with Survey Weights 
  Benefit Status at Survey  
 Ever SSDI Current Suspended Terminated 
Never 
Benefits 
Any Re- 
consideration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel 1 – No Lag 
Wait -0.000020 0.0021+ 0.00021 -0.0019** -0.00042 -0.0018 
 (0.00092) (0.0012) (0.00027) (0.00066) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
       
F-statistic 24.04 24.04 24.04 24.04 24.04 24.04 
N 2131 2131 2131 2131 2131 2131 
Panel 2 – 1 Month Lag 
Wait 0.00088 0.0039** -0.00017 -0.0014 -0.0024+ -0.0028+ 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.00041) (0.00089) (0.0014) (0.0016) 
       
F-statistic 23.22 23.22 23.22 23.22 23.22 23.22 
N 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 
Notes: Table reports the estimates of the effect of wait time on outcomes, from 12 IV 
regressions. The second panel controls for 1-month lagged wait time. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic on the instrument is reported at the 
bottom of each panel. + denotes significance at the 0.1 level, * at the 0.05 level, and ** at 
the 0.01 level. 
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Table A8. Effects of Wait Time on Health and Well-Being, with Survey Weights 
 
Activity 
Limitations 
Functional 
Limitations 
Good or 
Better 
Health 
Bed 
Days BMI 
Mental 
Health 
Symptoms 
Health 
Care 
Access 
Index SNAP 
<= 100% 
FPL 
Working 
Last Week 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel 1 – No Lag 
Wait 0.010* 0.0070 -0.00068 -0.081 0.042+ 0.0018 -0.00060 -0.00029 0.00045 -0.00075 
 (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0015) (1.06) (0.025) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0010) 
           
F-statistic 24.04 24.04 23.41 7.32 6.92 7.25 5.74 22.66 23.08 22.70 
N 2131 2131 2127 1131 969 1122 1079 2119 1717 2120 
Panel 2 – 1 Month Lag 
Wait 0.017** 0.0061 -0.0019 -0.14 0.051 0.0037 -0.00034 0.00058 0.0025 -0.00050 
 (0.0055) (0.0068) (0.0018) (1.91) (0.039) (0.0034) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0012) 
           
F-statistic 23.22 23.22 22.43 4.60 4.72 4.56 3.37 21.50 21.10 20.99 
N 2064 2064 2060 1089 933 1080 1038 2052 1662 2054 
Notes: Table reports the estimates of the effect of wait time on outcomes, from 20 IV regressions. The second panel controls for 1-month 
lagged wait time. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic on the instrument is reported at the bottom of 
each panel. + denotes significance at the 0.1 level, * at the 0.05 level, and ** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table A9. Effect of Wait Time on Components of Health Care Access Index 
  Forewent due to cost:     
 
Dentist 
Past 12mo 
Prescription 
Medicine 
Mental 
health Care 
Dental 
Care 
Medical 
Care 
Delayed 
for Cost 
Usual 
Place for 
Care 
No 
Insurance 
> $500 
Out of 
Pocket 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel 1 – No Lag 
Wait 0.00035 -0.00064 -0.0025 0.0011 -0.00074 -0.00095 0.00020 -0.0013 0.00029 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.00098) (0.00088) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.00091) 
          
F-
statistic 8.60 8.07 8.00 8.07 33.30 33.25 8.476 31.61 30.04 
N 1116 1121 1119 1120 2128 2129 1108 2121 2087 
Panel 2 – 1 Month Lag 
Wait -0.0035 0.0011 -0.0029 0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0011 -0.0011 0.0018 
 (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0015) 
          
F-
statistic 7.52 7.44 7.33 7.53 41.55 41.17 7.781 39.16 37.17 
N 1075 1079 1077 1078 2061 2062 1066 2054 2020 
Notes: Table reports the estimates of the effect of wait time on outcomes, from 18 IV regressions. The second panel controls for 1-month 
lagged wait time. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic on the instrument is reported at the bottom of 
each panel. + denotes significance at the 0.1 level, * at the 0.05 level, and ** at the 0.01 level. 
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a b s t r a c t 
The Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship Program (MMUF) encourages underrepre- 
sented minority (URM) students to pursue PhD study with an eye toward entering 
academia. Fellows have completed PhDs at high rates relative to other students, but they 
are selected for their interest and potential. In this paper we use restricted access data 
from the Mellon Foundation and the National Science Foundation’s Survey of Earned Doc- 
torates to investigate the effect of the MMUF on PhD completions by URM students who 
graduate from participating institutions. We ﬁnd no evidence that participation in the pro- 
gram causes a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the numbers of PhDs completed by URM 
students, and increases greater than about one PhD per institution per cohort lie outside 
a 95% conﬁdence interval of our estimates. This suggests that at least some of the PhDs 
completed by participants would have occurred without the program. 
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction 
Colleges and universities seek to diversify their faculty 
along several dimensions, but ﬁnd few underrepresented 
minorities 1 in their hiring pool, with the problem worse in 
some ﬁelds than others. This is a manifestation of what is 
often referred to as the pipeline problem. Relatively few 
minorities pursue graduate study in many disciplines in 
the humanities, social sciences, physical sciences, or life 
sciences. If individuals do not enter PhD programs in a 
given ﬁeld they will not emerge from the other end of the 
pipeline as potential faculty members.  Cornell Higher Education Research Institute (CHERI). CHERI receives 
ﬁnancial support from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation but the conclu- 
sions we express here are strictly our own. The use of NSF data does not 
imply NSF endorsement of the research, research methods, or conclusions 
contained in this paper. 
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: + 1 440 669 2594. 
E-mail address: garyrcohen@gmail.com , grc64@cornell.edu 
(G.R. Cohen). 
1 Underrepresented minorities are deﬁned as those who identify nei- 
ther as non-Hispanic White nor as Asian. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2016.04.005 
0272-7757/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. The Mellon Minority Undergraduate Fellowship Pro- 
gram, since renamed the Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fel- 
lowship Program (MMUF), was established in 1988 with 
the goal of addressing this issue by encouraging underrep- 
resented minorities to pursue graduate study in particular 
ﬁelds, with an eye toward ultimately entering academia. 
Participating schools select fellows from among their stu- 
dents, coordinate mentoring, and hold regular seminars 
which emphasize research and graduate school. Fellows 
receive stipends to allow them to conduct research as 
undergraduates. They are eligible to attend regional and 
national conferences at which they can present their own 
research, learn about that done by other fellows, and net- 
work. Fellows can also receive up to $10,0 0 0 in loan repay- 
ments. 
As of 2014, over 40 0 0 students have participated in the 
program; 506 have earned PhDs and another 665 PhDs 
are in progress ( Bengochea, 2013 ). As the program has 
expanded over time and as most PhD programs take at 
least 5 years to complete, if not substantially longer, this 
suggests an extremely high rate of PhD completion by 
MMUF scholars. A back of the envelope estimate suggests 
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 that about a quarter of MMUF students will eventually
complete a PhD, compared with around 4% of under-
represented minority students graduating from MMUF
institutions in years their school was not participating in
the program. 2 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the MMUF may play
a large role in the ultimate PhD completion of its partic-
ipants. MMUF administrators report struggling to recruit
undergraduate candidates because few students have con-
sidered the possibility of entering academia, and fellows
cite their research experiences, relationships with mentors,
and connections with other fellows as crucial to their
decision to pursue a PhD and their ultimate success in
completing one ( Rose, 2012 ). However, fellows presumably
apply to the program because of their own interest and
are selected based on their potential as scholars, so the
high rate of PhD completion reﬂects both this selection
and the effects of the program. Indeed, in a 2007 survey,
67% of current and former fellows responded that they
would have or might have aspired to earn a PhD absent
the program ( Rose, 2012 ). The MMUF may still help stu-
dents turn these goals into reality, and inspire those who
would not have otherwise considered an academic career
to explore one, but fellows are probably quite different
from other students in their underlying propensity to
complete a PhD. It also may be the case that students
who have already completed the program overstate their
chances of pursuing PhDs in its absence. Without a doubt
some current and former fellows would have aspired to
earn PhDs in the program’s absence, and so it is useful to
determine to what extent fellows’ high PhD completion
rate is a result of the program. 
We address this issue by estimating the effect of a
school’s MMUF participation per se and the intensity of
participation on the number and rate of PhD comple-
tions by under-represented minority (URM) students. 3 By2 If we assume that the program selected the same number of fellows 
in each year for a total of 40 0 0 as of 2014 and their distribution of com- 
pletion times was the same as non-white non-Asian students who com- 
pleted a bachelors’ degree in a MMUF ﬁeld in 1985–1989 and went on 
to complete a PhD, we would expect to observe about half of those PhDs 
which will be completed within 20 years of graduation. As approximately 
one in eight MMUF fellows has completed a PhD, this suggests that about 
a quarter of MMUF fellows will do so eventually. The program has grown 
over time, which would make this back of the envelope calculation an un- 
derestimate. However, fellows also have incentives and supports to com- 
plete degrees more quickly, so degrees completed so far may represent a 
larger proportion of those that will eventually be completed. 
3 The Mellon Foundation considers throughput—the entry of its fellows 
into PhD programs—to be a key metric for assessing the undergraduate 
components of the program ( Bengochea, 2013 ). While the PhD comple- 
tion rate of the URM student body as a whole is not an explicit program 
goal, the best available data for causal analysis limit our focus to comple- 
tion and to an estimate of the treatment effect on an average URM stu- 
dent at a participant school rather than a Mellon Mays fellow speciﬁcally. 
We believe that this average treatment effect is an appropriate metric for 
evaluation, as it is closely linked to the pipeline problem that is the rai- 
son d’etre for the MMUF, and any increase in fellows’ PhD completion that 
results from the program should also increase the overall number of URM 
students completing PhDs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 investigating the outcomes of all URM students at an insti-
tution we are able to avoid this sample selection problem,
and address the effect of the program on its medium-run
goal. Institutions have joined the program gradually over
time, and this allows us to control for time trends and
cross-institution variation using institution and year ﬁxed
effects. However, due to the lengthy nature of PhD pro-
grams we do not observe the completions of many of those
who will eventually earn a PhD, especially in later cohorts.
Time to degree is in general longer for URM students than
for other students, exacerbating the problem. We estimate
the size of this truncation using data from those who grad-
uated in the early years of our dataset, and conduct the
bulk of our analyses using this adjusted data. 
While our focus is on a single fellowship, many other
programs share the broad goals and methods of the MMUF.
To our knowledge these programs have not been evalu-
ated in the economics literature, but several prior stud-
ies in the education literature have explored their effects.
Most of this work has been purely correlational, which
is problematic as students who participate are quite dif-
ferent from those who do not. Other analyses have used
propensity score matching to construct an appropriate con-
trol group of students, but participants may still differ from
non-participants in important but unobservable ways (e.g.
Eagan et al., 2013 ). We contribute to this literature by
using a design that allows us to avoid the issue of stu-
dent selection, addressing problems of truncation in degree
data, and analyzing a program whose causal effects are un-
known. 
We estimate the average effect of an institution’s par-
ticipation in the MMUF program and ﬁnd no statistically
signiﬁcant effect of the program when considering only the
MMUF schools. These ﬁndings persist when we account for
truncation and when we add control groups constructed
through propensity score matching. We also ﬁnd no effect
of adding an additional fellow or increasing the percentage
of URM students who are fellows. This is particularly no-
table as these estimates may suffer from positive selection
bias: institutions are able to move funds from year to year,
awarding more fellowships in years with relatively strong
applicant pools and fewer in other years. In addition, our
conﬁdence intervals rule out a causal effect of more than
one additional PhD per cohort on average, with an average
cohort size of 4.8 students. Whether that effect is mean-
ingful is open to interpretation. If we assume that about a
quarter of fellows will eventually go on to complete PhDs,
it suggests the MMUF is supporting some students who
would complete PhDs anyway. Because we are evaluating a
small program using aggregate data, it is possible the pro-
gram has an effect that is too small for us to distinguish. It
may also be that the MMUF is important to participants in
other ways that do not signiﬁcantly increase the number
of PhDs, or that our truncation adjustments do not ade-
quately capture changes in the time to degree over time. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 provides background and further detail on
the program structure and history. Section 3 describes
our data and methods. Section 4 presents results and
Section 5 discusses these results and our conclusions. 
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 2. Background and program structure 
2.1. Background 
Colleges and universities pursue faculty diversity for 
several reasons. First, if minority faculty members are bet- 
ter at connecting with minority students, either in the 
classroom or as mentors and role models, their presence 
might be important to the persistence and graduation rates 
of minority students. There is some evidence that minor- 
ity students are more likely to persist in STEM majors if 
they have an introductory STEM course that is taught by 
a minority professor ( Price, 2010 ), and that gaps between 
minority and non-minority community college students in 
pass rates, grades, and courses dropped are smaller when 
classes are taught by professors who are minorities them- 
selves ( Fairlie, Hoffmann, & Oreopoulos, 2011 ). Second, to 
the extent that raw teaching and research potential are 
distributed throughout the population, hiring underrepre- 
sented minorities at a very low rate implies that institu- 
tions are losing out on important groups of potential fac- 
ulty. Finally, diversity may be pursued for its own merits. 
It can stimulate a dynamic academic atmosphere, enriching 
the work and lives of all faculty and students; address so- 
cietal inequalities; or bring academic attention to a wider 
range of issues that would otherwise be the case. 
Institutions that seek to diversify faculty are con- 
strained by the small number of underrepresented mi- 
norities completing PhDs. In 2011, 6.14% of the US citi- 
zens or permanent residents earning a PhD reported that 
they were Black, while 6.3% reported that they were His- 
panic ( National Science Foundation, 2012 ). These num- 
bers are substantially higher than at the inception of the 
MMUF (4.8% and 3.6% in 1985 respectively), but still quite 
low relative to the US population, which was 12.3% Black 
and 16.7% Hispanic in 2011 ( United States Census Bureau, 
2011 ). There is also substantial variation across ﬁelds, with 
Black students earning 13% of PhDs in education but only 
3% of those in physical sciences, and Hispanic students 
earning 8% of PhDs in social sciences and 4.5% of those 
in the physical sciences ( NSF, 2012 ). While departments in 
some ﬁelds might ﬁnd a diverse range of job candidates 
others are still constrained in their ability to hire from un- 
derrepresented minority groups. 
2.2. The Mellon Minority/Mays Undergraduate Fellowship 
Program 
The MMUF program began with eight institutions, 
which joined the program in late 1988 and recruited 
their ﬁrst fellows in the spring of 1989. Additional co- 
horts joined in 1989, 1992, 1996, 20 0 0, and 20 07. A group 
of Historically Black Colleges and Universities has partic- 
ipated since 1989 through a consortium administered by 
the United Negro College Fund (UNCF). 4 Not counting this 4 The UNCF is a consortium of 37 private Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities (HBCUs) and among the most well-known of these institu- 
tions are Clark Atlanta, Fisk, Morehouse and Spelman. The consortium is 
permitted to choose up to 25 fellows a year from across their member in- 
stitutions. As of the Spring of 2015, 614 fellows had been selected. Ninety consortium, 42 institutions participated in the program in 
2014 ( Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship, 2013 ). A ta- 
ble of the institutions in our sample and the year they 
joined the program appears in Appendix Table A1 . 
Participating institutions select fellows, generally tar- 
geting students in the spring of their sophomore year. 
Schools are provided with funding for up to ﬁve fellows 
per year, though they are able to select more fellows in 
some years by moving funds from one school year to an- 
other, or if students who were previously selected drop 
out of the program. In the early years of the program fel- 
lowships were restricted to those belonging to underrepre- 
sented minority groups. However, in response to concerns 
from participating institutions about the legality and ethics 
of aﬃrmative action and other race-based programs, eligi- 
bility was extended in 2003 to students of all backgrounds 
who were committed to the program’s goal of increasing 
the presence of underrepresented minorities in academia 
( Mellon Foundation, 2003 ). In addition to supporting the 
diversity goals of the program, fellows must be pursuing a 
major in one of the Mellon-designated ﬁelds. These span 
the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences, but 
do not include all majors. A list of the ﬁelds for 20 0 0 and
2008 is included in Appendix Table A2 . 
Students apply directly to the fellowship program at 
their institution. Although each institution has consider- 
able discretion in evaluating applicants, they are asked to 
consider the student’s ﬁeld and either minority status or 
commitment to the program’s goals, as well as academic 
promise, interest in an academic career, and potential as a 
mentor. Once selected as fellows, students work with men- 
tors and attend seminars at their home institution. Because 
of the decentralized nature of the program, each partici- 
pating school decides how to implement the mentorship 
and seminar components. Mentors are intended to act as 
graduate school advisers—much as a pre-law or pre-med 
adviser would—and to oversee the student’s independent 
research. Seminars are in general focused on research and 
preparation for graduate school, and are intended also to 
allow students to form a group identity. Fellows also re- 
ceive stipends both during the school year and over the 
summer to allow them to focus on research rather than 
paid work, and to potentially allow for ﬁeldwork or study 
at another institution over the summer. The MMUF admin- 
isters regional and national conferences at which students 
can present work, be exposed to the work done by other 
fellows, and network with current and former fellows. 
After college graduation, fellows who attend graduate 
school in a designated ﬁeld can be eligible to participate 
in seminars and conferences, apply for grants expressly 
for former undergraduate fellows, and receive loan for- 
giveness. The seminars and conferences include an annual 
conference similar to that attended by undergraduates as 
well as programs focused on writing grants and disserta- 
tions. There are also retreats for those in the dissertation- 
writing phase. Loans taken out for undergraduate and 
graduate study are eligible for loan forgiveness, up to of these fellows had completed PhDs and 71 more were enrolled in PhD 
programs at that time. Our analyses exclude the UNCF consortium for rea- 
sons described in the methods section. 
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Fig. 1. Displays the distribution of the number of fellows across institu- 
tions. For each year the smallest and largest cohorts are marked, as well 
as the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. In 1992 the smallest cohort was 
0 fellows, the 25th percentile 1 fellow, the 75th 5 fellows, and the largest 
6 fellows. In 1993 the smallest cohort had 0 fellows, the 25th percentile 
2 fellows, the 50th 4, the 75th 5, and the largest 8 fellows. In 1994 the 
smallest cohort had 0 fellows, the 25th percentile 3, the 50th 5, the 75th 
6, and the largest 8 fellows. In 1995 the smallest cohort had 0 fellows, 
the 25th percentile 2, the 50th 4, the 75th 6, and the largest 7 fellows. 
In 1996 the smallest cohort had 0 fellows, the 25th percentile 3, the 50th 
4, the 75th 5, and the largest 7 fellows. In 1997 the smallest cohort had 
0 fellows, the 25th percentile 3, the 50th 4, the 75th 6, and the largest 
9 fellows. In 1998 the smallest cohort had 0 fellows, the 25th percentile 
1, the 50th 4, the 75th 5, and the largest 6 fellows. In 1999 the smallest 
cohort had 0 fellows, the 25th percentile 2, the 75th 5, and the largest 7 
fellows. In 20 0 0 there were two outliers with small values (1 and 2) and 
two with large values (7 and 8). Among the rest of the sample, the small- 
est cohort had 3 fellows, the 25th percentile 3, the 75th 5, and the largest 
6 fellows. In 2001 the smallest cohort had 0 fellows, the 25th percentile 
4, the 50th 5, the 75th 7, and the largest 9 fellows. In 2002 the smallest 
cohort had 0 fellows, the 25th percentile 2, the 50th 4, the 75th 5, and 
the largest 7 fellows. In 2003 the smallest cohort had 0 fellows, the 25th 
percentile 3, the 50th 5, the 75th 6, and the largest 8 fellows. In 2004 the 
smallest cohort had 1 fellow, the 25th percentile 3, the 50th 6, the 75th 
7, and the largest 10 fellows. In 2005 the smallest cohort had 3 fellows, 
the 25th percentile 6, the 50th 5, the 75th 7, and the largest 11 fellows. 
Source : Administrative data provided by the Mellon Foundation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 a total of $10,0 0 0 if the student completes a PhD in a
Mellon-designated ﬁeld. Loan forgiveness is only available
to those who attend a PhD or terminal Masters’ program in
one of the designated ﬁelds, and requires the fellow to be-
gin his or her program within about 3 years of graduation
or submit an appeal. 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Data and sample 
Our analyses use data from the Integrated Post-
Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS), a restricted ac-
cess version of the National Science Foundation’s Survey of
Earned Doctorates (SED), and restricted access administra-
tive data from the Mellon Foundation. The IPEDS includes
institution-level information on enrollment, costs and ﬁ-
nances, faculty, and other characteristics for all colleges
and universities in the United States that receive federal
funding. Data is provided by institutions, and has been col-
lected in 1987 and then annually since 1989. The Higher
Education General Information System (HEGIS), the prede-
cessor to IPEDS, includes data for earlier years, dating back
to 1966. Many of the variables in the HEGIS data are the
same or similar to those in IPEDS, but HEGIS includes
less information and was collected less frequently. From
these systems we obtain institution-level information on
the number of students completing bachelors’ degrees by
race/ethnicity, gender, and ﬁeld from 1985 through 2005.
We also use a larger set of institutional characteristics,
drawn from the IPEDS Delta Cost Project data, in order to
construct matched comparison groups. 
The Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED) is an annual cen-
sus of PhD completers in the United States, sponsored by
six federal entities and administered since 1957. The SED
achieves a high response rate, with 92% of those earning
PhDs responding in 2012, although item response rates are
somewhat lower ( National Science Foundation, 2013 ). It in-
cludes information on demographics, undergraduate and
graduate study, and career plans. We use data from the
SED for those who completed a PhD between 1985 and
2011. From this population we count the number of indi-
viduals who have completed a PhD by undergraduate insti-
tution, year of bachelors’ degree, minority status, ﬁeld, and
gender. We also obtain counts of the number completing a
PhD a given number of years after the bachelors’ degree by
subgroup and year of bachelors’ degree. This data on the
distribution of times to PhD completion for the early co-
horts in our sample is used to adjust for the fact that later
cohorts have fewer years to complete a PhD, and thus their
numbers of PhD completers are understated due to sample
truncation. 
The Mellon Foundation’s data provides counts of MMUF
program fellows at each participant institution in each
year. The distribution of fellows by year and school is de-
picted in Fig. 1 . Although most institutions had 3–6 fel-
lows in most years of participation there is considerable
variation in the number of fellows. In general, the small-
est schools in terms of URM enrollment are more likely to
have fewer than 5 fellows in multiple years. We use this
data to calculate the ’dosage’ of the program within theoverall URM population of each cohort at each institution.
We then use this dosage and the raw numbers of partici-
pants in extensions to our base model to account for the
fact that we would expect the treatment effect of this rel-
atively small program to be more pronounced—and easier
to detect—at institutions where a greater proportion of the
URM population participated. 
Our analyses focus on the 32 non-UNCF institutions
that selected their ﬁrst fellows by 2005. The UNCF institu-
tions are excluded because program participation at each
UNCF school in any particular year is far more varied than
at the other U.S. institutions with most UNCF institutions
having zero participants in any given year. We are con-
cerned that we would be unable to discern the effect of
the program at these schools, and that the participation of
a given institution in the program in a particular year may
be a strong signal about the propensity of its students in
that cohort to attend graduate school. We limit our analy-
sis to cohorts that graduated by 2005, as more recent grad-
uates had completed relatively few PhDs by 2011. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of the non-UNCF institutions participating in the MMUF program by 
2005. 
N Mean SD 
Public control 32 0.125 0.336 
Highest degree 
Bachelors 32 0.219 0.420 
Doctorate 32 0.594 0.499 
Masters/ﬁrst professional 32 0.188 0.397 
Characteristics as of 1987 
Enrollment 32 8901.4 7768.5 
Tuition and fees per student 32 8834.22 3335.80 
Percent of students who are undergraduates 32 0.734 0.217 
1985 Graduates 
URM BAs 32 214.1 495.9 
non-URM BAs 32 831.7 610.6 
Proportion of BAs awarded to URM students 32 0.145 0.202 
PhD Completion Rate 32 0.106 0.078 
2005 Graduates 
URM BAs 31 333.1 269.6 
non-URM BAs 31 989.5 702.5 
Proportion of Bas awarded to URM students 31 0.229 0.12 
PhD completion rate 31 0.017 0.03 
Full sample, unadjusted 
URM PhDs—arts and sciences 693 5.94 5.43 
URM PhDs—arts and sciences and engineering 693 6.47 5.91 
URM PhDs—all ﬁelds 693 7.30 6.47 
Full sample, simple truncation adjustment 
URM PhDs—arts and sciences 693 7.37 6.58 
URM PhDs—arts and sciences and engineering 693 7.99 7.12 
URM PhDs—all ﬁelds 693 9.20 7.92 
Full sample, 10 year truncation adjustment 
URM PhDs—arts and sciences 693 6.94 6.16 
URM PhDs—arts and sciences and engineering 693 7.66 6.84 
URM PhDs—all ﬁelds 693 8.49 7.35 
 Most institutions in our sample are privately controlled 
( Table 1 ). A slight majority grant doctorates, with the rest 
about evenly split between those that only grant bachelor’s 
degrees and those that grant masters or ﬁrst professional 
degrees. In 1985, before the MMUF began, the average in- 
stitution produced slightly over 10 0 0 bachelors’ degrees, 
about 14% of which went to URM students. About 11% of 
graduates went on to complete a PhD by 2011, with rates 
fairly similar for URM and non-URM students. By 2005 
the average institution produced about 1300 bachelor’s de- 
grees, with about 23% going to URM students. Only 1.7% of 
these graduates completed a PhD by 2011, which is unsur- 
prising given that they only had 6 years to do so. 
We focus primarily on the sample of URM students, 
based on the assumption that the MMUF has the poten- 
tial to affect PhD completions for those students who are 
eligible to participate, but not those who are not eligible. 
In some analyses we include PhD completions for non- 
minority students as a control variable. While the intro- 
duction of a new fellowship opportunity could decrease 
competition for existing programs, change campus culture, 
or inspire the peers of fellows to pursue a different path, 
we do not expect these factors to be large, particularly 
as the program is relatively small, and its beneﬁts are re- 
stricted to fellows. To the extent that the beneﬁts of the 
MMUF spill over to those who are not eligible to partici- 
pate, our estimates would understate the full effect of the 
MMUF on PhD completion. Our initial plan was to restrict the analysis to PhD 
completions in MMUF ﬁelds, based on similar reasoning. 
We were forced to abandon this plan for several reasons. 
First, IPEDS reports only one major per BA completer un- 
til 20 0 0, and two in later years. Thus students with more 
than one major before 20 0 0, or more than two after, could 
be eligible for the program but not be identiﬁable in the 
data as being eligible. Second, a sizable number of stu- 
dents switch ﬁelds between BA and PhD. Third, although 
more recent data contains detailed information on un- 
dergraduate majors, HEGIS and IPEDS used a very broad 
coding scheme for completers’ ﬁelds (two-digit CIP) until 
1996. As a result we are unable to distinguish some of the 
MMUF ﬁelds in these early data. Finally, even with per- 
fect data we would not be able to deﬁne which students 
were eligible for the program based on ﬁelds, both be- 
cause institutions had some discretion to decide whether 
a ﬁeld closely related to a MMUF ﬁeld was eligible, and 
because documentation on which ﬁelds were eligible be- 
fore 20 0 0 does not exist. Instead we restrict the sample 
by broad categories of ﬁelds—arts and sciences; arts, sci- 
ences, and engineering; and all ﬁelds—rather than using a 
more speciﬁc deﬁnition of eligible ﬁelds. All MMUF ﬁelds 
from 20 0 0 and 20 08 fall into arts and sciences, which in-
cludes humanities, social sciences, life sciences, and phys- 
ical sciences. The arts, sciences, and engineering group 
adds engineering ﬁelds. The all ﬁelds category includes 
all BAs or doctorates, including those in arts, humanities, 
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Table 2 
Effect of MMUF participation on URM PhD production—model compar- 
ison. 
Model OLS Negative binomial 
(a) A&S 0 .466 −0 .151 
(0 .514) (0 .588) 
(b) A&S + Eng. 0 .343 −0 .273 
(0 .515) (0 .567) 
(c) All ﬁelds 0 .525 −0 .141 
(0 .508) (0 .564) 
Notes: Six models are reported: for each model, the dependent variable 
is the number of PhD completions among those non-white, non-Asian 
students who graduated from an institution in a particular year, with 
degrees in a particular group of ﬁelds as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). 
All models include the BA completion count for that cohort, as well 
as year and institution ﬁxed effects. Coeﬃcients are reported for the 
OLS model and marginal effects are reported for the negative binomial 
model. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by institution. 
A ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level, and a † the 1% 
conﬁdence level. 
Table 3 
Effect of MMUF participation on URM PhD production—unadjusted 
model. 
(1) (2) 
(a) A&S −0 .151 −0 .222 
(0 .588) (0 .561) 
(b) A&S + Eng. −0 .273 −0 .389 
(0 .567) (0 .552) 
(c) All ﬁelds −0 .141 −0 .221 
(0 .564) (0 .550) 
White and Asian PhDs 
√ 
Notes: Marginal effects from six negative binomial models are reported. 
For each model, the dependent variable is the number of PhD comple- 
tions among those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from 
an institution in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group 
of ﬁelds as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). All models include the BA 
completion count for that cohort as well as year and institution ﬁxed 
effects. Speciﬁcation ( 2 ) includes the comparable PhD count for white 
and Asian students. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by in- 
stitution. 
A ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level, and a † the 1% 
conﬁdence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and engineering, as well as ﬁelds such as education and
business. 
3.2. Method 
Using the Survey of Earned Doctorates, we amass data
on the number of graduates of a given institution in a
given year who have since gone on to earn a PhD. 5 This
is done separately for minority and non-minority students,
by the broad ﬁeld groups described above. We deﬁne BAsJ it
as the number of individuals in group J (URM or non-URM)
who completed bachelor’s’ degrees at institution i in year
t, and PhDsJ it as the number of those individuals who com-
pleted a PhD by 2011, when our information on PhD com-
pletion ends. 
In our baseline speciﬁcation we regress the PhD com-
pletion count for URM students ( PhDsM it ) on the count of
BAs awarded to that cohort ( BAsM it ) and whether the insti-
tution was participating in the program when that cohort
was eligible to be selected to participate ( MMF it ). We also
include graduation year ﬁxed effects ( T t ) in order to con-
trol for variations over time in the number of bachelors’
graduates completing PhDs nationally, and institution ﬁxed
effects ( I i ). Because the dependent variable is a count, we
estimate a negative binomial model, 6 assuming an expo-
nential functional form so that the mean of PhDsM it is given
by: 
E ( P hDs M it ) = I i exp ( β1 M M F it + β2 BAs M it + T t ) (1)
We also estimate the baseline equation with the addi-
tion of the count for non-minority students ( PhDsNM it ) in-
cluded as an explanatory variable, but we ﬁnd that this
does not signiﬁcantly alter our ﬁndings and so exclude it
from later analyses. Standard errors are clustered at the in-
stitution level. 
4. Results 
4.1. Baseline estimates 
Results from the baseline speciﬁcation are displayed in
Table 2 . Despite the beneﬁts of the MMUF felt by its par-
ticipants, the model is unable to detect any impact of the
program on the PhD production of URM graduates. We ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant effect of the program on PhD completions,
and point estimates are mostly less than zero, suggesting
small decreases in the number of PhDs completed. Using
the negative binomial model, an increase in PhD comple-
tions in the arts and sciences larger than 1.001 PhDs per
participating school per cohort lies outside a 95% conﬁ-
dence interval. By comparison, the OLS model allows an in-
crease as large as 1.47 within the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Results are similar when we include the non-minority PhD5 We also study the PhD completion rate, deﬁned as the proportion of 
BAs from a given institution in a given year who go on to earn PhDs dur- 
ing our sample. We ﬁnd that models using PhD counts are easier to inter- 
pret, but rate models are discussed as a robustness check, and full results 
are available in appendix B. 
6 Our tests indicate overdispersion, so we favor negative binomial re- 
gression. Poisson estimation yields very similar results and so is not re- 
ported here. Table 2 includes an OLS model for comparison. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 completion counts ( Table 3 columns 2 and 4) and when
considering degrees in all ﬁelds. 
Because more schools have joined the MMUF program
over time, and later cohorts suffer greater truncation, our
baseline model likely understates the impact of the pro-
gram. For example, a student who completed his or her
bachelor’s degree in 2002 has only 9 years to complete
a PhD by 2011, the last year of data available to us on
PhD completions. This number is below the median time
to degree for some ﬁelds, and thus will miss more than
half of the potential PhDs. Because PhDs in progress at
the time of measurement are treated as though they will
never be completed, the PhD production rate would ap-
pear to be declining over time if it were constant. Then,
because the MMUF program is introduced throughout our
sample period, participation effects are confounded with
truncation effects. URM students take longer on average
to complete PhDs, so controlling for the equivalent non-
minority count does not eliminate the problem of trunca-
tion. Differences in time to degree are illustrated in Fig. 2 ,
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Fig. 2. Displays the distribution of time to PhD separately for underrep- 
resented minorities (Non-White, Nonresults Asian) and White and Asian 
students. The density for both groups is at ﬁrst ﬂat near zero then climbs 
steeply until about 10 years. It then decreases at a slower and decreasing 
rate. The curve for underrepresented minorities lies to the right of that 
for White and Asian students. 
Notes: Sample includes all US Citizens and Permanent Residents who 
completed a PhD in one of the MMUF ﬁelds between 1980 and 2011, com- 
pleted a BA in the US, and responded to the Survey of Earned Doctorates. 
Source: Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Earned Doc- 
torates 
Table 4 
Effect of MMUF participation on URM PhD production—truncation ad- 
justments. 
(1) (2) 
(a) A&S 0 .134 0 .391 
(0 .737) (0 .765) 
(b) A&S + Eng. 0 .037 0 .393 
(0 .731) (0 .795) 
(c) All ﬁelds 0 .211 0 .518 
(0 .779) (0 .787) 
Simple adjustment 
√ 
10-year adjustment 
√ 
Notes: Marginal effects from six negative binomial models are reported. 
For each model, the dependent variable is the predicted number of PhD 
completions among those non-white, non-Asian students who gradu- 
ated from an institution in a particular year, with degrees in a partic- 
ular group of ﬁelds as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). All models include 
the BA completion count for that cohort as well as year and institution 
ﬁxed effects. The simple adjustment is a truncation adjustment under 
the assumption that the time to PhD pattern from 1985–1989 persists 
throughout the sample. The 10-year adjustment is a truncation adjust- 
ment with a quadratic model in time ﬁt to the ﬁrst 10 years of data. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by institution. 
A ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level, and a † the 1% 
conﬁdence level. which presents the distribution of PhD completion times 
for all SED respondents who completed their BA in the 
US and are US citizens or permanent residents. 7 Indeed, 
Table 3 demonstrates that including information on non- 
URM PhD completions hardly affects the estimates of pro- 
gram participation at all. 
In order to improve this estimate we implement two 
strategies to adjust for the fact that we do not observe 
PhDs in progress. The ﬁrst takes the distribution of time 
to PhD that prevailed in the ﬁrst 5 years of our sample and 
applies it to the remainder of the data. That is, we pre- 
dict how many of those who have completed bachelor’s 
degrees but are not recorded as having completed PhDs 
them will eventually complete a PhD, and use that to form 
our estimate of PhD completions. We do this separately 
for URM and non-URM students. Students from these early 
cohorts have at least 20 years post-college to ﬁnish their 
graduate degrees, so truncation is likely to be a much 
smaller problem. If this method captures truncation pat- 
terns accurately it puts all cohorts on an equal footing. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that it makes the strong 
assumption that the time-to-PhD distribution is ﬁxed over 
time. 8 
To address this latter concern, we estimate a second 
model where we allow the truncation pattern to change 
over time. We do this by estimating a quadratic model on 
early cohorts for each number of years from BA y, where t 7 This ﬁgure understates the difference in degree completion time 
somewhat, as URM students make up a larger proportion of PhD com- 
pletions in later cohorts, and members of later cohorts with particularly 
long times to degree do not appear in the data. 
8 In fact, formal statistical tests that we conducted suggest that this as- 
sumption is not strictly true. is the number of years from 1985: 
P r ( Completewithinyyears ) = α0 + α1 t + α2 t 2 (2) 
We then apply this to the rest of the sample as be- 
fore. Similarly to the previous approach, we would like to 
ﬁt the prediction model to a set of data where truncation 
is less problematic. We therefore run speciﬁcations where 
this prediction model is applied to the ﬁrst 10 years of data 
(1985–1994). 9 Table 4 displays results after correcting for 
truncation. The results of the ﬁrst, ’ﬁxed’ truncation model 
are presented in the ﬁrst column, while those from 10-year 
quadratic model are presented in column 2. 
Both methods of correcting for truncation produce sim- 
ilar results—adopting the MMUF does not appear to have 
a signiﬁcant effect on an institution’s URM PhD comple- 
tions. Using the same method as before, the largest poten- 
tial effect size for arts and sciences within a 95% CI of the 
point estimate is 1.89 PhDs per cohort for the model un- 
der the 10-year truncation adjustment. The point estimate 
itself predicts only 0.518 additional PhDs per cohort—larger 
than the estimates produced without correcting for trunca- 
tion, but not statistically signiﬁcant. 
Our analyses so far have used only the MMUF schools, 
using those institutions in years before they began partic- 
ipating in the program as controls. Although our estimates 
are fairly precise, we would like to introduce additional 
control observations. Estimating the program effect using 
the sample of all U.S. institutions would greatly overstate 
the effects of the program, as many MMUF institutions 
were selected for participation in the program speciﬁcally 
because they are high-quality colleges and universities 
where PhD production is already high. Instead we select 
two matched control groups constructed using the Stata 9 We investigated a similar quadratic model using the ﬁrst ﬁve years of 
data, and the results were qualitatively similar. 
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Table 5 
Effect of MMUF participation on URM PhD production—matched com- 
parison. 
(1) (2) 
(a) A&S 0 .205 0 .127 
(0 .586) (0 .653) 
(b) A&S + Eng. 0 .143 0 .131 
(0 .631) (0 .700) 
(c) All ﬁelds 0 .301 0 .219 
(0 .630) (0 .726) 
1 Nearest neighbor 
√ 
Kernel 
√ 
Notes: Marginal effects from six negative binomial models are reported. 
For each model, the dependent variable is the predicted number of PhD 
completions among those non-white, non-Asian students who gradu- 
ated from an institution in a particular year, with degrees in a particular 
group of ﬁelds as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). Prediction is a trunca- 
tion adjustment with a quadratic model in time ﬁt to the ﬁrst 10 years 
of data. All models include the BA completion count for that cohort as 
well as year and institution ﬁxed effects. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered by institution. 
A ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level, and a † the 1% 
conﬁdence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Effect of intensity of MMUF participation on URM PhD production. 
(1) (2) 
(a) A&S 0 .171 −0 .582 
(0 .089) (2 .567) 
(b) A&S + Eng. 0 .188 ∗ 0 .961 
(0 .094) (2 .646) 
(c) All ﬁelds 0 .178 −0 .947 
(0 .096) (4 .019) 
Count 
√ 
Dosage 
√ 
Notes: Marginal effects from six negative binomial models are reported. 
For each model, the dependent variable is the predicted number of PhD 
completions among those non-white, non-Asian students who gradu- 
ated from an institution in a particular year, with degrees in a particular 
group of ﬁelds as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). Prediction is a trunca- 
tion adjustment with a quadratic model in time ﬁt to the ﬁrst 10 years 
of data. All models include the BA completion count for that cohort as 
well as year and institution ﬁxed effects. Column ( 1 ) presents estimates 
of the marginal effect of adding an additional fellow on the number of 
PhDs completed. Column ( 2 ) presents estimates of the marginal effect 
of increasing the program size as a proportion of the non-white, non- 
Asian graduating class. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by 
institution. 
A ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level, and a † the 1% 
conﬁdence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 command psmatch2 to estimate the probability that each
institution would be selected to participate in the MMUF
program based on its observable characteristics. 10 The
ﬁrst control group uses 1-nearest-neighbor matching to
select the non-treated institution with the nearest propen-
sity score to each treated institution as an appropriate
control. 11 We match with replacement, meaning that a
non-treated school can serve as the match for more than
one treated school if no other non-treated school is a
‘better’ control. 
The second matched control group is constructed using
kernel matching to construct an appropriate control insti-
tution from a combination of non-participating schools. A
list of the variables employed in the matching routine ap-
pears as Appendix Table A3 , and a list of the schools in the
1-nearest neighbor match appears as Appendix Table A4 . 
Results from the matching procedures are presented in
Table 5 . These estimates employ the 10-year ﬂexible trun-
cation correction described above. We ﬁnd no evidence
that participation affected the PhD completion count in
arts and sciences, and in fact our point estimates and their
standard errors are very close to those in Table 4 that do
not include a matched comparison group. 
4.2. Estimates of program intensity 
In addition to changes in whether a school was par-
ticipating in the MMUF in a given year there is consider-
able variation in the size of a MMUF cohort for a given
school. This variation should improve our ability to iden-
tify the effect of the program and offer an estimate of the
effect of changing the size of the program at an institution.10 The CUNY schools are excluded from this approach, as their informa- 
tion on the predictor variables we use is reported at the system level and 
thus we cannot separate treated from non-treated CUNY schools. 
11 We estimated the same models with Malahnobis-metric matching 
and obtained qualitatively similar results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 We do this ﬁrst by estimating the effect of increasing the
number of fellows (MMFellows it ) on the number of PhDs
completed by URM students (PhDsM it ). As in the base-
line model we include year ﬁxed effects ( T t ) and institu-
tion ﬁxed effects ( I i ). We include a control for the number
of BAs completed by URM students (BAsM it ). Once again
we estimate using negative binomial and regression so the
mean of PhDsM it is given by: 
E ( PhDs M it ) = I i exp ( β1 MMFellow s it + β2 BAs M it + T t ) (3)
We ﬁnd uniformly positive point estimates for the ef-
fect of adding an additional fellow, but these estimates are
not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels ( Table 6 ).
If correct, our estimates would imply that each student
added to the MMUF program adds about 0.171 arts and
sciences PhDs that otherwise would not have been com-
pleted. This null ﬁnding is particularly interesting as the
estimates include both the effect of adding a fellow and
whatever factors drove a school to add that fellow, which
likely includes the strength of a given cohort. 
As an alternative to estimating the effect of adding a
given number of fellows, we estimate the following, where
Dosage it is deﬁned as the number of fellows from gradua-
tion cohort t at institution i divided by the number of URM
students in that cohort and institution. This model gives
the expectation of PhDsM it as: 
E ( PhDs M it ) = I i exp ( β1 Dosag e it + β2 BAs M it + T t ) (4)
Increasing the dosage of the program appears to de-
crease the PhD completion count for all ﬁeld groups but
arts and sciences plus engineering, although this associ-
ation is nowhere statistically signiﬁcant. Once again, us-
ing a 95% conﬁdence interval around the negative binomial
model’s estimate for arts and sciences we could rule out
a change in expected arts and sciences PhD completions
of more than 4.45 per cohort from a 100% increase in the
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Table 7 
Event study of the effect of MMUF adoption on the URM PhD completion rate. 
t −5 t −4 t −3 t −2 t −1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 
Arts and sciences 1 .901 † −0 .343 0 .691 −0 .128 −0 .188 0 .759 0 .181 −0 .185 1 .151 −0 .237 −0 .448 
(0 .633) (0 .692) (0 .647) (0 .686) (0 .591) (0 .686) (0 .610) (0 .489) (0 .776) (0 .560) (0 .600) 
Arts sci. and eng. 1 .933 † −0 .060 0 .847 −0 .169 0 .059 0 .701 0 .071 −0 .461 1 .391 −0 .073 −0 .061 
(0 .748) (0 .695) (0 .666) (0 .737) (0 .658) (0 .706) (0 .638) (0 .563) (1 .036) (0 .663) (0 .719) 
All ﬁelds 2 .035 † −0 .179 0 .856 0 .053 0 .106 0 .743 0 .376 −0 .481 1 .470 0 .220 −0 .264 
(0 .711) (0 .752) (0 .632) (0 .660) (0 .672) (0 .691) (0 .664) (0 .578) (1 .104) (0 .686) (0 .758) 
Notes: Marginal effects from thirty three negative binomial models are reported. For each model the dependent variable is the predicted number 
of PhD completions among those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from an institution in a particular year relative to the ﬁrst MMUF 
cohort at that institution (t). Prediction is a truncation adjustment with a quadratic model in time ﬁt to the ﬁrst 10 years of data. All models include 
the BA completion count for that cohort as well as year and institution ﬁxed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by institution. 
A ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level, and a † the 1% conﬁdence level. 
Table 8 
Effect of MMUF participation on the URM PhD completion rate − unadjusted model. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
(a) A&S 0 .011 −0 .001 0 .013 −0 .001 
(0 .016) (0 .005) (0 .018) (0 .005) 
(b) A&S + Eng. −0 .010 −0 .003 −0 .010 −0 .003 
(0 .009) (0 .005) (0 .009) (0 .004) 
(c) All ﬁelds −0 .014 −0 .005 −0 .014 −0 .005 
(0 .009) (0 .004) (0 .009) (0 .004) 
Weights 
√ √ 
Non-URM PhD completion rate 
√ √ 
Notes: OLS coeﬃcients from 12 models are reported. For each model, the dependent variable is the rate of PhD completion among those non-white, 
non-Asian students who graduated from an institution in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group of ﬁelds as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). 
All models include year and institution ﬁxed effects. Speciﬁcations ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) include the comparable rate for white and Asian students. Weights are 
by size of institution in number of URM BA completers. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by institution. 
A ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level, and a † the 1% conﬁdence level. program dosage. This would correspond to expanding the 
MMUF to cover each school’s entire URM population, and 
in that context is quite a small effect. 
4.3. Robustness 
We explore the possibility that the adoption of the 
MMUF program is not random by investigating whether 
there are any changes in PhD completions up to 5 years 
before and up to 5 years after program adoption. For this 
analysis we focus on the data adjusted using the 10-year 
truncation model. We ﬁnd some evidence of an increase in 
PhD production for all three degree groups 5 years before 
the ﬁrst cohort was eligible to participate ( Table 7 ). How- 
ever, no trend is apparent. This may suggest that our trun- 
cation adjustment is insuﬃcient to account for the issue of 
degrees in progress, or simply be a data artifact. 
Rather than analyzing the number of PhDs completed 
by URM students, it is possible to instead consider the PhD 
completion rate—the percentage of URM bachelors’ recip- 
ients who go on to complete a PhD. This model would 
be more appropriate than those discussed previously if in- 
stitutions with larger numbers of URM students complet- 
ing bachelors’ degrees could expect greater gains, as might 
be the case if the fellowship somehow changed the ex- 
pectations or attitudes of both non-participants and par- 
ticipants. This strategy also allows us to experiment with 
weighting observations by the number of URM bachelors’ 
degrees. This simple weighting scheme has the potential to increase precision, but is only optimal if the effect of 
the program on completion rates is homogenous across in- 
stitutions and the likelihood of PhD completion is not cor- 
related within institution cohorts after controlling for insti- 
tution and year ﬁxed effects ( Solon, Haider, & Wooldridge, 
2015 ). Because these assumptions may not be satisﬁed 
we also report the unweighted results. Using our base- 
line speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd no evidence that the MMUF 
increases PhD completion rates, and are able to rule out 
increases larger than ﬁve percentage points as outside of 
a 95% conﬁdence interval of any of the baseline models 
( Table 8 ). Results from other speciﬁcations lead us to sim- 
ilar conclusions as those using the number of PhDs com- 
pleted, and are presented in Appendix B ( Appendix Ta- 
bles B1–B3 ). 
We also conduct our baseline estimates with 
institution-speciﬁc linear trends to allow for the pos- 
sibility that each institution follows its own trend. The 
results are similar to those found without the inclusion of 
institution-speciﬁc time trends, and are not included for 
brevity. 
5. Conclusion 
We describe the Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellow- 
ship Program, the supports it offers its participants, and 
its growth over time. Using a census of undergraduate 
completions from the Department of Education as well as 
a census of PhD completions from the National Science 
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Table A1 
Non-UNCF Mellon Mays institutions participating by 2005. 
Institution name First year of participation 
Barnard College 1998 
Bowdoin College 1993 
Brown University 1994 
Bryn Mawr College 1990 
California Institute of Technology 1994 
Carleton College 1989 
Columbia University 1997 
Cornell University 1990 
CUNY Brooklyn College 1990 
CUNY City College 1990 
CUNY Hunter College 1990 
CUNY Queens College 1990 
Dartmouth College 1990 
Duke University 1998 
Emory University 2001 
Harvard University 1990 
Haverford College 2001 
Macalester College 2001 
Oberlin College 1989 
Princeton University 1990 
Rice University 1994 
Smith College 20 0 0 
Stanford University 1989 
Swarthmore College 1990 
University of Chicago 1990 
University of Pennsylvania 1990 
University of Southern California 1994 
Washington University in Saint Louis 1994 
Wellesley College 1990 
Wesleyan University 1991 
Williams College 1990 
Yale University 1990 
Table A2 
Mellon-designated ﬁelds. 
Fields as of 20 0 0 
Anthropology and Archaeology 
Area/Cultural/Ethnic/Gender Studies 
Art History 
Classics 
Demography, Geography and Population Studies 
Earth/Environmental/Geological Science and Ecology 
( continued on next page ) Foundation, we then attempt to estimate the causal effect
of the MMUF program on the PhD completions of URM
bachelors’ graduates at participant schools. We ﬁnd no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant effect of an institution’s participation
in the program and a 95% conﬁdence interval rules out
an effect of more than about 1 PhD per cohort using our
baseline estimates. We also ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of
increasing the number or percentage of fellows, although
we do ﬁnd predominantly positive point estimates for the
number of fellows that would suggest an effect of about
0.171 additional PhDs for each additional fellow. In both
cases these estimates are small relative to the 25% of
MMUF fellows who are expected to complete PhDs—
suggesting an upper bound of 68% on the proportion of
MMUF fellows who complete PhDs who would not have
done so otherwise. 
Several factors could explain our null ﬁndings. First, the
program may simply not do much to increase the number
of PhDs produced by URM students. If the program selects
the brightest and most motivated students it may beneﬁt
those who would have already been likely to attend grad-
uate school and earn PhDs even in its absence. This would
not necessarily mean that the MMUF is unimportant—the
program could increase the quality of the institutions fel-
lows attend for their doctoral studies, improve disserta-
tions produced or job skills gained, speed completion, or
improve the ﬁnancial position of graduates. Any of these
effects could increase the number of URM students enter-
ing academia, in addition to being beneﬁcial to fellows, but
we are not able to capture them in our data. The Survey of
Earned Doctorates is collected at the time of PhD comple-
tion and thus is limited in its ability to measure most vari-
ables pertaining to careers in academia. Second, the small
size of the program at each institution might inhibit our
ability to discover an overall effect with statistical mod-
els: if only a handful of students in each year are MMUF
participants, the largest possible effect the program could
have on PhD production will similarly be small. Despite
our rather precise estimates we may be failing to detect
a real, but small, effect of the program. This is less likely
given the insigniﬁcant effects we ﬁnd for increases in pro-
gram intensity, but those are still complicated by the sub-
stantial noise of PhD completions by non-fellows. Finally,
our truncation correction could simply be incorrect. If the
true truncation pattern is not ﬁt or well approximated by
any of our models we may fail to ﬁnd results where any
exist. The true distribution of degree completion times is
unknowable until all degrees can be observed, so we can-
not rule out this possibility. 
Our ﬁndings are most generalizable to expansions of
the MMUF to institutions relatively similar to those that
already participate or increases in the size of the program
at MMUF institutions. Many MMUF schools are quite
unlike the average U.S. institution and were selected in
part based on their high PhD-going rates and a perception
that many students had the potential and preparation
for a career in academia. However, the program has also
been implemented at institutions selected more for the
diverse populations they serve (e.g. CUNY schools), where
overall student preparation may not be as high. It would
be interesting to extend our study to the subsample of theCUNY schools and the state universities that were later
introduced to the program, but that shrinks the pool of
observations too greatly to draw meaningful conclusions
from the data. There are also other programs that are
broadly similar to the MMUF (such as the McNair Scholars
Program) to which these same empirical methods could
be applied. 
Despite the caveats listed above, we hope our ﬁndings
will prove instructive to designers of future policies. If a
program aims to maximize its impact on the number of
students achieving any particular benchmark it is impor-
tant not only to design the program to beneﬁt its recipi-
ents but also to select those recipients on the margin of
the desired outcome. 
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Table A2 ( continued ) 
English 
Ethnomusicology 
Film, Cinema and Media Studies (theoretical focus) 
Foreign Languages and Literatures 
Linguistics 
History 
Literature 
Mathematics 
Musicology 
Philosophy 
Oceanographic/Marine/Atmospheric/Planetary Science 
Physics and Astronomy 
Political Theory 
Religion and Theology 
Theater (non-performance focus) 
2008 Field Additions 
Computer Science 
Sociology 
Table A3 
Predictor variables for propensity score matches. 
Institution is Public 
Fall Enrollment 
Ratio of Undergraduates to All Students 
Ratio of Female Undergraduate Students to All Undergraduate 
Students 
Ratio of Full-Time Undergraduate Students to All Undergraduate 
Students 
Ratio of Full-Time Female Faculty to All Female Faculty 
Ratio of Female Faculty to All Faculty 
Ratio of Full-Time Faculty to All Faculty 
Ratio of Faculty to All Staff
Avg. 9–10 Month Salary for All Male Faculty 
Avg. 9–10 Month Salary for All Female Faculty 
Ratio of Undergraduate STEM Completions to All Undergraduate 
Completions 
Ratio of Undergraduate Humanities Completions to All 
Undergraduate Completions 
Tuition and Fees per Student 
Endowment Income per Student 
Total Revenues per Student 
Instruction Expenditure per Student 
Academic Support Expenditure per Student 
Student Services Expenditure per Student 
Total Scholarship Expenditures per Student 
Percentage of Student Body that is Black 
Percentage of Student Body that is Asian 
Percentage of Student Body that is Hispanic 
Table A4 
Matched control institutions, nearest neighbor match. 
Baptist Bible College of Pennsylvania 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Case Western Reserve University 
Davidson College 
Georgetown University 
Goucher College 
Le Moyne-Owen College 
Long Island University 
( continued on next page ) 
Table A4 ( continued ) 
North Carolina State University at Raleigh 
Northwestern University 
Radcliffe College 
Saint Basil’s College 
San Diego State University 
San Francisco Conservatory of Music 
Seton Hall University 
Smith College 
Southern University Agricultural and Mechanical College 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
Table B1 
Effect of MMUF participation on the URM PhD completion rate—
truncation adjusted. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(a) A&S 0 .027 0 .001 0 .007 −0 .001 
(0 .031) (0 .004) (0 .015) (0 .005) 
(b) A&S + Eng. −0 .003 −0 .001 −0 .011 −0 .002 
(0 .007) (0 .004) (0 .008) (0 .004) 
(c) All ﬁelds −0 .008 −0 .004 −0 .014 −0 .004 
(0 .006) (0 .003) (0 .008) (0 .003) 
Weights 
√ √ 
Simple adjustment 
√ √ 
10-year adjustment 
√ √ 
Notes: OLS coeﬃcients from 12 models are reported. For each model, 
the dependent variable is the predicted rate of PhD completion among 
those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from an institution 
in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group of ﬁelds as in- 
dicated by (a), (b), and (c). All models include the comparable rate for 
white and Asian students, as well as year and institution ﬁxed effects. 
The simple adjustment is a truncation adjustment under the assump- 
tion that the time to PhD pattern from 1985 to 1989 persists through- 
out the sample. The 10-year adjustment is a truncation adjustment with 
a quadratic model in time ﬁt to the ﬁrst 10 years of data. Weights are 
by size of institution in number of URM BA completers. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered by institution. 
A ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level, and a † the 1% 
conﬁdence level. 
Table B2 
Effect of MMUF participation on the URM PhD completion rate, using a 
matched comparison group. 
(1) (2) 
(a) A&S −0 .009 −0 .0 0 0 
(0 .006) (0 .004) 
(b) A&S + Eng. −0 .013 −0 .003 
(0 .007) (0 .003) 
( continued on next page ) Appendix B 
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Table B2 ( continued ) 
(1) (2) 
(c) All ﬁelds −0 .014 −0 .004 
(0 .007) (0 .003) 
1 Nearest neighbor 
√ 
Kernel 
√ 
Notes: OLS coeﬃcients from six models are reported. For each model, 
the dependent variable is the predicted rate of PhD completion among 
those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from an institu- 
tion in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group of ﬁelds 
as indicated by (a), (b), and (c). Prediction is a truncation adjustment 
with a quadratic model in time ﬁt to the ﬁrst 10 years of data. All mod- 
els include the comparable rate for white and Asian students, as well 
as year and institution ﬁxed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered by institution. 
A ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level, and a † the 1% 
conﬁdence level. 
Table B3 
Effect of intensity of MMUF participation on the URM PhD completion 
rate. 
(1) (2) 
(a) A&S −0 .560 ∗ −0 .253 
(0 .254) (0 .099) 
(b) A&S + Eng. −0 .166 0 .035 
(0 .092) (0 .103) 
(c) All ﬁelds −0 .250 † 0 .127 
(0 .086) (0 .173) 
Unadjusted 
√ 
10-year adjustment 
√ 
Notes: OLS coeﬃcients from six models are reported. For each model 
the dependent variable is the predicted PhD completion rate among 
those non-white, non-Asian students who graduated from an institu- 
tion in a particular year, with degrees in a particular group of ﬁelds as 
indicated by (a), (b), and (c). Prediction is a truncation adjustment with 
a quadratic model in time ﬁt to the ﬁrst 10 years of data. All models in- 
clude the comparable rate for white and Asian students, as well as year 
and institution ﬁxed effects. Columns ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) present estimates of 
the effect of increasing the dosage of the program on PhD completion 
rates, with Column ( 2 ) additionally adjusting for truncation. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered by institution. 
A ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level, and a † the 1% 
conﬁdence level. 
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